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Legal Certainty in the MERCOSUR:
The Uniform Interpretation of Community Law
Jan Kleinheisterkamp *
The MERCOSUR is a young and ambitious integration project that is the largest and
most successful of its kind in Latin America. However, the financial turbulence at the
beginning of this year has shown that the project's economic and overall success depends
heavily upon the new Community's ability to offer a stable framework for investors. An
important part of this framework is legal certainty. In the absence of a supranational court,
the uniform application of Community regulations poses a serious problem. This article
offers a solution by presenting a uniform method of interpretation adjusted to the special
nature of the MERCOSUR. First, the article analyzes the character and structure of the
Community law and shows the legal obligation of national judges to interpret and apply
this law in a uniform way. A comparative study of the legal methodology in the Member
States as well as the associated countries serves as the basis for developing a uniform
method of interpretation. This method derives from the essence of the Community law of
the MERCOSUR and the national legal traditions, fulfilling both the postulates of autono-
my and acceptability. The key element of this work is the method of comparative law.
I. Introduction.
The young Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and its legal
framework present a new challenge for scholars dedicated to the economic law of Latin
America. Recent turbulences linked to the "Samba-Effect" and the "Tango-Crisis' which
may be considered childhood diseases of the dynamic integration process, show very
clearly how important legal certainty is for the success of the economic integration.' For
the participants of the economic and financial life of the MERCOSUR, on whose confi-
dence and acceptance the ambitious project heavily depends, legal certainty is a funda-
* The author wishes to thank especially Dr. Katharina Pistor and Mr. lens Scherpe, both col-
leagues at the Max-Planck-Institute, Hamburg, for their great help with the English version of
the manuscript, and Dr. Jorgen Samtleben, head of the Department of Latin America, for his
most valuable comments.
1. See, e.g., 33 EUROSuR - THE EUROPEAN UNION / MERCOSUR DOCUMENTARY LINK 3-4 (1999) (com-
menting on the consequences of the crisis for the inner stability of the MERCOSUR and its
development).
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mental factor for investment decisions and, therefore, a major point in the discussion
about the region's global competitiveness.2
Legal research on the MERCOSUR should aim at presenting and analyzing its laws in
view of the practical needs of making the law accessible to its users. Legal certainty is inti-
mately linked with the predictability of the outcome of litigation, the final stage of any
potential dispute. Assessing predictability requires solid knowledge of the criteria for
decisions by the competent courts. How will the court decide? Or, to be more precise,
how will the courts interpret the relevant statutory norms to find their decision?
These questions show that research on specific legal matters of the MERCOSUR can
only be completed through interpretation of both the law on the books and the law in
action. This research raises the question as to the choice of methods of construction. The
norms of the MERCOSUR form part of the respective national legal orders after they are
transformed. National judges apply these norms when resolving disputes between indi-
viduals. Although the norms have their roots in international treaties, the matters regulat-
ed by national judges often directly affect the legal relationship between private parties
transacting within the MERCOSUR. This ambivalence leads to the general problem of
how the law of the MERCOSUR is to be interpreted. This question has so far not been
answered satisfactorily by legal scholars. With the objective, but also the limitations, of
finding a workable framework for analyzing the law of the MERCOSUR, this article offers
a tentative solution.
II. Interpretation of the Law of the MERCOSUR.
Explaining the method of construction depends decisively on the essential character
of the norms to be interpreted.
A. CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE MERCOSUR.
In article 1 of the constitutive instrument of the MERCOSUR, the Treaty of
Asunci6n of 1991,3 the Member States committed themselves to "harmoniz[ing] their
legislation in the relevant areas to achieve the strengthening of the process of integra-
2. Pablo Labandera Ipata, Aspectos Juridico-Institucionales Que Operan como Freno para la
Integraci6n, [1998-4] REV. DER. MERCOSUR 63, 75-76; Felix Pefia, La Seguridad Juridica en el
Mercosur: Notas en Torno al Caso "Cafts La Virginia," 7 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y
COMUNITARIO 451, 454, 460 (1996); AMALIA URIONDO DE MARTINOLI, INTEGRACION REGIONAL:
DERECHO PROCESAL INTERNACIONAL, MERCOSUR 53 (1996); Ariel D. Dasso, Mercosur
Problemrdtica Juridica, [1991-E] L.L. 1241, 1253; see also Brazilian Ministry of Justice, The
Justification of its Proposal for a Protocol on Private Mediation and Arbitration (Mar. 13, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("t imperioso para a consolidaqfto do Mercado
Comum do Sul que as transa 6es comercias e financeiras privadas prosperem intensamente.
[Com o vasto incremento de com~rcio entre os Estados Partes] dever dos Estados Partes
propiciarem a exist~ncia de ambiente adequado As transa 6es internacionais, sendo um dos
seus matizes a seguranqa juridica ...).
3. 1 Boletin Oficial del MERCOSUR [B.O.M.] 13 (1997), translated in 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991)
(entered into force Nov. 29, 1991) (Tratado para la Constituci6n de un Mercado Comtln entre la
Reptiblica Argentina, la Rep6blica Federativa del Brasil, la Repfiblica del Paraguay y la Rep6blica
Oriental del Uruguay [Treaty for the Constitution of a Common Market) of Mar. 26, 1991).
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tion" through the establishment of a common market. The "real constitution" of the
MERCOSUR, the Protocol of Ouro Preto (POP) of 1994, 4 specifies how harmony
should be achieved.
1. The Community Law of the MERCOSUR.
Article 41 of the POP identifies the Treaty of Asunci6n, its protocols (including the
POP itself), and the additional or complementary instruments (I) as the primary sources
of law of the MERCOSUR. 5 Article 41 of the POP also names the agreements included
within the scope of the Treaty of Asunci6n and their protocols (II), as well as the
Decisions, Resolutions, and Directives of the respective organs of the MERCOSUR (III).6
The hierarchy of norms of this legal construction does not seem to be fully settled, 7 thus
showing an apparent need for further intensive scientific discussion. At the moment, one
can in substance only evaluate the hierarchy of legal norms for individual cases on the
basis of general principles, considering the objectives of the instruments of integration.8
The majority of agreements (acuerdos) based on article 41 11 of the POP constitute specif-
ic international treaties that need to be ratified by the Member States to enter into force, 9
even though they are entitled as Protocolos (with direct reference to the Treaty of
Asunci6n) and are adopted formally by the Council of the Common Market (Consejo del
Mercado Comtn, hereinafter CMC). 10 In contrast, article 42 stipulates that the other acts
of the Community organs are mandatory 1 and, if necessary, have to be incorporated by
4. 1 B.O.M. 33 (1997), translated in 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1995) (entered into force Dec. 15, 1995)
(Protocolo Adicional al Tratado de Asunci6n sobre la Estructura Institucional del MERCOSUL
[Additional Protocol about the Institutional Structure of the MERCOSUR] of Dec. 17, 1994).
5. MIGUEL A. EKMEKDJIAN, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO COMUNITARIO 270 (1994) (calling this the
"Constitutional Law of the MERCOSUR").
6. See 1 B.O.M. 49 (1997) (entered into force July 16, 1993) (Article 19 of the Protocol of Brasilia
(Decision CMC 1/91, Protocolo de Brasilia para la Soluci6n de Controversias of Dec. 17, 1991)
(naming these sources of the law in the same order, as to be applied by the arbitrators of the
mechanism of conflict resolution between the member states regarding the interpretation of
the provisions of the MERCOSUR)); see also EKMEKDJIAN, supra note 5, at 270-71, 288.
7. J irgen Samtleben, Der SUdamerikanische Gemeinsame Markt (MERCOSUR) Und Seine
Verfassung, 1996 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND BANKENRECHT, WERTPAPIERMITrEILUNGEN
[WM] 1997 (1997) (discussing the fundamental problems arising from the situation around
the Treaty of Asunci6n as the founding instrument of the MERCOSUR, for which article 53 I
POP determines its provisions might have been implicitly derogated by later Decisions of the
CMC (upon which it is based) during the period of transition until the entry into force of the
POP as the "regular constitution of the MERCOSUR").
8. Id. at 2003.
9. Id. at 2003-04 (calling them "conventional law of integration" as compared to the other formal
acts as "law of integration set by the organs" whose transformation is left to the discretion of
the individual states).
10. See infra notes 26 and 60 (giving a possible explanation of this procedure by the opinion of the
Argentine Foreign Ministry and the reasons presented, respectively).
11. See Protocol of Ouro Preto, Dec. 31, 1994, art. 9, 34 I.L.M. 1244 [hereinafter POP] (repeating
the already-established compulsory nature of the Decisions of the CMC; Id. art. 15 (establish-
ing the Resolutions of the Common Market Group (Grupo Mercado Comtin) (GMC); Id. art.
20 (establishing the Directives of the Commission for Commerce of the MERCOSUR
(Comisi6n del Comercio del MERCOSUR) (CCM).
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the Member States into their legal systems in correspondence with their respective
national requirements. These norms can be referred to as derived norms, 12 which are
somewhat similar to the secondary legislation of the European Community.
The fact that the Protocol of Ouro Preto did not provide the organs of the MERCO-
SUR with supranational competence, even after the period of transition, raises further
problems. 13 Thus, the entire legal system of the Community, from a narrow point of
view, so far only represents a construction of public international law, raising doubts
about the justification to speak of a Community law as a legal order (sui generis) indepen-
dent from classical public international law.14 However, the primary sources of law and,
even more so, the agreements and the formal acts of the Community organs, even in their
framework of public international law, inter alia, grant rights and impose duties directly
on the citizens of the Member States with the objective of economic integration and uni-
fication of their legislations.' 5 These agreements and formal acts create a law of integra-
tion that has the quality of internally applicable law for the citizens and the competent
national judge. At the same time, the law of integration originates from international
obligations of the Member States, 16 as is evident in the primary sources of law and the
agreements included within the scope regulated by article 41 1 and II of the POP. Thus,
the agreements and formal acts of the Community organs show the double nature of
internationally uniform laws. 17 Combined with the primary aim of regional integration,
it is justifiably considered a form of Community law of the MERCOSUR, despite the
absence of supranationality. 18
12. See, e.g., Jurgen Samtleben & Calixto Salomao Filho, 0 Mercado Comum SulAmericano - Uma
Andlise Juridica do Mercosul, in CONTRATOS INTERNACIONAIS 239, 272 n.169 (Jodo Grandino
Rodas ed., 2d ed. 1995).
13. See, e.g., Samtleben, supra note 7, at 2006; JUrgen Samtleben, Das Internationale Prozef- und
Privatrecht des MERCOSUR, 63 RABELSZ 1, 5 (1999) (providing further references).
14. Cf. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1, 24,
1963 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963); Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1964 C.M.L.R. 425
(1964) (discussing the qualification of the legal order of the European Community by the
European Court of Justice (E.C.J.)). See also the German Constitutional Court since its resolu-
tion of October 18, 1967, 22 BVERFGE 293, 295-96 (1968).
15. See Samtleben & Filho, supra note 12, at 270 (explaining the direct effect of individual provi-
sions of the Treaty of Asu nci6n in terms of "self-executing norms").
16. See Juan Carlos Cassagne, El Mercosury las Relaciones con el Derecho Interno, [ 1995-C] L.L. 875,882.
17. Cf Wilhelm F. Bayer, Auslegung und Erginzung International vereinheitlichter Normen Durch
Staatliche Gerichte, 20 RABELSZ 601,629 (1955).
18. Case 26/62, supra note 14 (discussing this case with respect to these criteria of qualifications of
the young European legal order as Community law where the supranationality is only named
as one of various indicators); see also Maurice Lagrange, La Interpretaci6n Unitaria del Derecho
de las Comunidades Europeas - Aspectos de la Acci6n Prejudicial, 3 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION
[INTAL] 56, 59 (1968); Dasso, supra note 2, at 1253; Cassagne, supra note 16, at 882; see also,
e.g., Hctor Alegria, El Mercosur Hoy: La Realidad, Pragmatismo e Ideales, [1995-El L.L. 838,
845; Samtleben, supra note 7, at 2003; Cf Luiz Olavo Baptista, Aplica~ao das Normas do MER-
COSUL no Brasil, [1998-21 REV. DER. MERCOSUR 28; Nuri Rodriguez Olivera, Mercosur como
Instrumento para la Creaci6n de un Derecho Comunitario, 1 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO 39-40 (1997) speaking only of the "law of integration" due to the lack of suprana-
tionality); Jorge H. Lavopa, Organizaci6n Institucional y Derecho Comunitario en el Mercosur,
148 E.D. 899, 909 (1992) (speaking of"a sort of embrional Community law,' offering maybe
the most precise description).
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2. The Special Case of the Parallel Agreements with the Associated Countries.
In addition to the legal harmonization in the four Member States of the MERCO-
SUR, parallel international agreements were concluded with Chile and Bolivia, which
establish uniform regulations in specific areas for all six countries.19 The most significant
parallel agreement to date is the Agreement on International Commercial Arbitration,
approved by Decision CMC 4/98. This agreement is practically identical to the corre-
sponding agreement of the MERCOSUR, approved by Decision CMC 3/98.20 This agree-
ment will serve as an example to demonstrate the nature of parallel regulation.
To enter into force, CMC 4/98 needs to be ratified by at least two Member States of
the MERCOSUR and by one associated country (article 26, paragraph I). As contracting
parties, the preamble identifies the MERCOSUR, Bolivia, and Chile (paragraph 2), reveal-
ing the MERCOSUR's legal personality of public international law conceded by article 34
of the POP.2 1 Corresponding to article 35 of the POP, the Community should be able to
act on its own with legally binding effect, but because of the missing supranationality of
its organs, all Member States have to sign the agreement instead. Accordingly, all Member
States are named as signatory parties in the preamble of CMC 4/98 (paragraph 1).
This procedure demonstrates that the parallel agreements have the form of an inter-
national treaty concluded by the MERCOSUR as a subject of international law with third
states. This raises the question whether a parallel agreement is part of the internal legal
order of the MERCOSUR in the same sense as the article 41 II POP agreements and
should therefore be governed by the same rules as the Community law.
CMC 4/98 has been included in the framework of the Treaty of Asunci6n and the
POP in paragraph 3 of the preamble, which fulfills the requisites of article 41 11 of the
POP. Yet, this can only be relevant for the Member States that are parties to these instru-
ments, which excludes Bolivia and Chile. Accordingly, the signatory parties also made ref-
erence to the association agreements between the MERCOSUR and the other states, 22 as
well as to Decisions CMC 14/9623 and 12/9724 (paragraph 4 of the preamble), which
form the basis of participation of the associated countries in any activities of the MER-
COSUR. This means that the parallel agreements integrate the associated countries pre-
19. See infra note 119 (providing an example of a parallel agreement in Europe).
20. Decision CMC 3/98, 7 B.O.M. 19 (1999); Decision CMC 4/98, 7 B.O.M. 29 (1999) (providing
that both concluded in Buenos Aires on July 23, 1998); see also 8 B.O.M. 30 (providing the
other relevant existing parallel agreement on extradiction, concluded in Rio de Janeiro on Dec.
10, 1998 and approved as Decision CMC 15/98, which follows the same pattern).
2 1. See Samtleben, supra note 7, at 1997.
22. Agreements of Partial Range for Economic Complementation (Acuerdos de Alcance Parcial de
Complementaci6n Econdmica) [AAP.CE] Nr. 36 (with Bolivia) and Nr. 35 (with Chile), which
were concluded in the framework of the Latin American integration process originated by the
Latin American Integration Association (Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n) [ALADI]
created by the Treaty of Montevideo (1980); see also Samtleben, supra note 13, at 4 n.7.
23. Mercado Comum do Sul (MERCOSUL), (visited July 26, 1999)
<http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/decisions/DEC1496P.stm> (commenting on the ad hoc
participation of associated third states at the reunions of the MERCOSUR).
24. 5 B.O.M. 34-35 (1998) (commenting on the institutionalized participation of Chile at the
activities of the MERCOSUR).
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liminarily in the specific areas of the "daily life" of the Community.25 This can be regard-
ed as an anticipation of the amplification of the MERCOSUR. 26 In these specific areas,
the associated countries regard themselves as being part of the Community and have thus
been treated accordingly. Therefore, even though not representing Community law in a
strict sense, the parallel agreements should still be treated as representational. 27
3. National Transformation: Effects and Hierarchy of the Community Law in the
Domestic Legal Orders.
The national transformation of the norms requires special attention because it deter-
mines the application of these norms to private individuals in the MERCOSUR. In the
case of international agreements, this transformation occurs via the internal legislative
piocedure that makes these laws mandatory; in the case of formal acts by the organs of
25. Decision CMC 4/98, supra note 20 (representing a milestone of the efforts of integration with
respect to the associated countries because, for the first time after the fundamental AAP.EC Nr.
35 & 36, uniform rules are established for the "extended" MERCOSUR. This followed the pro-
cedure established for Chile in art. 5 of Decision CMC 12/97:
Chile participard en las Reuniones de Ministros del MERCOSUL y en las corre-
spondientes reuniones tcnicas preparatorias. Los Acuerdos que se alcancen sertn
celebrados en primera instancia como instrumentos del MERCOSUL. Cuando
ambas partes lo estimen de interns, esos mismos textos serAn suscritos entre el
MERCOSUL y Chile en ocasi6n de las Reuniones del Consejo del Mercado
Comtin y serdn incorporados en el marco del ACE N* 35 cuando corresponda.
26. Decision CMC 3/98 (clearing up the fact that, being the first example for paralleled
Community law, this decision does not contain a so-called clause of adhesion, through which
the accession to the Treaty of Asunci6n leads ipso lure to the respective expansion of territorial
jurisdiction of the other protocols containing it); see generally Samtleben, supra note 13, at 69.
Such a clause was not necessary due to the anticipation of the expanded validity of the content
of CMC 3/98 by the parallel agreement with the already associated countries (Decision CMC
4/98). Accordingly, the opinion of Argentina's Foreign Ministry is that such a clause is dispens-
able in any case because all agreements, by being simultaneously approved as Decisions of the
CMC, become integrative parts of the Treaty of Asunci6n; cf MERCOSUR/CT-RMJ/ACTA
N°4/98* (Annex II of the Minutes of the XXXVI Meeting of the Comisi6n T~cnica de la
Reuni6n de Ministros de Justicia del MERCOSUR June 9-11, 1998 in Buenos Aires) *(unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with Argentine Ministry of Justice, Office of the Law of Integration,
and author).
27. See supra note 18 (providing understanding of vigorous prerequisites to qualify as Community
law); Cafts La Virginia, C.S., Oct. 13, 1994, 1995-D L.L. 275, 288 (Arg.) (Boggiano, J.) (refer-
encing the famous Van Gend & Loos E.C.J. decision (see supra note 14), Justice Boggiano pos-
tulates a treatment corresponding to that given to the European Community law also for the
agreement concluded in the framework of the Treaty of Montevideo of 1980 with the justifica-
tion of "the high level of integration reached" (emphasis added); see also Pefia, supra note 2, at
456 (giving an iniciative of Latin American integration that is commonly regarded as a com-
plete failure); Cassagne, supra note 16, at 877; Art. 5 I Decision CMC 12/97 ("Chile participarA
en las Reuniones de Ministros del MERCOSUL y en las correspondientes reuniones t6cnicas
preparatorias. Los Acuerdos que se alcancen serdn celebrados en primera instancia como
instrumentos del MERCOSUL. Cuando ambas partes lo estimen de interns, esos mismos textos
serdn suscritos entre el MERCOSUL y Chile en ocasi6n de las Reuniones del Consejo del
Mercado Comin y serAn incorporados en el marco del ACE [short form for AAP.CE, supra
note 221 N' 35 cuando corresponda" (emphasis added)).
Winter 2000 11
the Community, the transformation takes the form each state considers necessary for
such norm to enter into force. 2 8 The form of transformation thus determines the hierar-
chy of the Community norms in the domestic legal order, that is, for the significance that
the domestic judge will attribute to them. Because the application of the transformed
Community law lies primarily in the hands of the national judge and because his decision
directly impacts the legal relationships between private individuals, if in doubt, the hier-
archy should be determined on the basis of court rulings.29
With respect to norms based on international agreements, significant differences can
be observed between individual states, including the associated countries. In Argentina
and Paraguay, after the last major constitutional reforms, the supremacy of the trans-
formed international law, and thus of the Community law vis-a-vis the simple internal
law, excluding the constitutional law, results directly from the countries' respective consti-
tutions.30 In contrast, the constitutions of the other countries do not make reference to
the hierarchy of international norms.
In Chile, for example, the formal prevalence of international obligations is not
clear,3 1 but the factual prevalence of treaties, as leges speciales, has been recognized repeat-
28. See Samtleben, supra note 7.
29. ANTONIO BOGGIANO, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL: RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE LOS
ORDENAMIENTOS JURIDICOS 98 (1995); see also Michel Gaudet, El juez Nacional y la Comunidad
Europea, 6 INTAL 56, 58-59 (1970).
30. Constituci6n Nacional del Paraguay [Constitution] art. 137 (1992) (Para.) ("La Ley suprema de la
Repfiblica es la Constituci6n. Esta, los tratados, convenios y acuerdos internacionales aprobados y
ratificados, las leyes dictadas por el Congreso y otras disposiciones juridicas de inferior jerarquia,
sancionadas en su consecuencia, integran el derecho positivo nacional en el orden de prelaci6n
enunciado.") This has been already applied by the Paraguyan Courts in Trib. Apel. Crim. Asunci6n
June 16, 1995, 18 L.L. PARAGUAY 512, 515 (1995); see also Mario A.R. Mid6n, El tratamiento consti-
tucional de la integraci6n entre los signatarios del Mercosur, [ 1997-B] L.L. 1037, 1049-50; Martha L.
Olivar Jimenez, La comprensi6n del concepto de derecho comunitario para una verdadera integraci6n
en el Cono Sur, in MERCOSUL - SEUs EFEITOS JURIDICOS, ECONOMICOS E POLITICOS NOS ESTADOS-
MEMBROS 15, 59-60 (Maristela Basso ed., 1995); Tribunal de Apelaci6n del Trabajo Asunci6n (July
29, 1993) 16 L.L.PARAGUAY 600, 601 (1993) (discussing the apparently equal situation before the
constitutional reform); MIGUEL A. PANGRAZIO, CODIGO CIVIL PARAGUAYO COMENTADO 104 (1990).
Constituci6n Nacional de Argentina [Constitution] art. 75 Nr. 22 12 (1994) (Arg.) ("Los tratados
[...] tienen jerarquia superior a las leyes."). See generally id. art. 75 Nr. 24 ("Corresponde al Congres
[...] Aprobar tratados do integraci6n que deleguen competencias y jurisdicci6n a organizaci6n
supraestatales en condiciones de reciprocidad e igualdad, y que respeten el orden democrdtico y
los derechos humanos. Las normas dictadas en su consecuencia tienen jerarqufa superior a las
leyes.'); Mid6n, supra, at 1039, 1045-46; C.S. Ekmekdjian c. Sofovich (July 7, 1992), [1992-C] L.L.
540, 547-48; Fibraca Constructora c. Comisi6n Tecnica Mixta de Salto Grande (July 7, 1993) 154
E.D. 161; Cafts La Virginia, C.S., Oct. 13,1994, [1995-D] L.L. 275,279 (Arg.).
31. Compare C.S., Nov. 14, 1988, 85 RDJ 11-5 252, 253, 259 (Chile) (confirming the range of simple
national law), with C.A. Santiago, Mar. 7, 1988, 85 RDJ 11-2 11, 12 (Chile) (referring to article 27 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and, implicitly, to the general principle of pacta sunt
servanda, to justify the prevalence of the GATT Treaty over an opposing domestic norm; C.S. (Jan.
11, 1995) 177 GAC. JUR. 165, 167 (1995) (giving the constitutional basis of the transformation of
international law); see also (art. 5 II and 50 Nr. 1 of the Constitution (Constituci6n Politica de la
Reptiblica)); see generally Santiago Benadava, Las Relaciones Entre Derecho Internacional y Derecho
Interno Ante Los Tribunales Chilenos, 59 RDJ 1, 25 (1962); JUrgen Samtleben, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit
in Chile, 1983 RECHT DER INTENATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 167, 168, n.3 (providing further references).
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edly.32 Therefore, national laws enacted subsequently should also be interpreted in con-
formity with international treaties signed by Chile. 33 In principle, the same holds true in
Bolivia 34 and Uruguay.35
Originally, the situation in Brazil was somewhat more problematic. Here, the courts
tended to always let the internal law prevail 36 until they explicitly recognized the equal
rank of domestic and international law (including the application of the basic rule of lex
specialis derogat leges generales).37 Therefore, today the situation in Brazil is similar to that
of Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay.38
In summary, as of today, the observance of international obligations and, therefore,
the prevalence of the transformed Community law, is at least de facto guaranteed. 39 A
32. Cf C.S., Nov. 30, 1993,90 RDJ 11-6 159,170, 172 (Chile); C.S., Jan. 11, 1995, 177 GAC. JUR. 165,
167 (Chile) (confirming the sentence of first instance); Benadava, supra note 31, at 25.
33. Id.
34. See JAIME PRUDENCIO COSIO, CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 27-28 (La Paz 1971)
(describing the equal hierarchy); C.S. (July 18, 1978) 1624 GAc. JUD. 277, 291 (1978) (promot-
ing the priority of international treaties leges speciales).
35. Cf Mid6n, supra note 30, at 1048; see also Jimenez, supra note 30, at 60; Heber Arbuet Vignali,
Condiciones para la Aplicaci6n de una Norma Internacional en el Ambito Interno, 5 REVISTA DE LA
FACULTAD DE DERECHO 131, 173 (1993) (defending an absolute priority of the international
law); Adolfo Gelsi Bidart, Tribunal de Justicia para el Mercosur, 1 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO 57, 62 (1991) (defending somewhat more cautiously). But see S.C.J. (June 20, 1990)
102 LJU 1 109, 111 (1991) (demonstrating where a national norm could not be interpreted in
harmony with a prior treaty was given preference over the latter in full conscience of the inter-
national responsibility); Tribunal de Apelaciones en lo Civil de 2o. Turno (Sept. 19, 1988) 101
LJU I 5, 6 (1990) (interpreting the later treaty restrictively in the light of prior national legisla-
tion). See also Tribunal de Apelaciones en lo Civil de ler Turno (20.12.1994) 112 LJU 1389,391
(1995) (recognizing the primacy of the treaties in special procedural question due to article
524 C6digo General de Proceso (1988), which states "En defecto de tratado o convenci6n, los
tribunales de la Repfblica debertn dar cumplimiento a las normas en el presente Titulo.").
36. Jurgen Samtleben, Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Lateinamerika, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND BANKENRECHT, WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WM] 769 (1989), relying on
RSTF, 01.07.1977, 83 RTJ DD.MM.1978, p. 809, by which the doctrine was found that any later
domestic regulation could overrule the effectiveness of a transformed treaty, irrespective of any
international responsibility due to the breach of the treaty. This doctrine, in principle, has been
affirmed by RSTF, 28.11.1996, D.J.U. 30.5.1997, p. 23176; see also Mid6n, supra note 30, at
1049.
37. RSTF 28.11.1996, D.J.U. 30.5.1997, p. 23176, supra note 36 (rejecting a general priority); see
also STJ, 13.12.1995,85 LEX ISTJ/TR.F. 112 DD.MM. 1996, p. 114.
38. Cf. Jimenez, supra note 30, at 57-58; Mid6n, supra note 30, at 1049 (As an exception, the inter-
national treaties prevail over the Brazilian tax legislation, due to the express provision of article
98 of the National Tax Code: "C6digo Tribut~irio Nacional"). See generally STJ, 08.09.1998,
D.J.U. 23.11.1998, p. 159; Baptista, supra note 18, at 34-35 (deriving from the argumentum e
contrario the principal of equal hierarchy with the domestic law in all non-express cases); TJSP,
19.05.1998, 756 R.T. DD.MM.1998, p. 125, (deserving special attention interpreting Article 157
CPC strictly in the light of the Protocoll of Las Lefias on Judicial Cooperation (1992), supress-
ing the procedural requisite of translation of a Spanish document, thus letting Community
Law prevail over the restrictive national law).
39. Cf. Mid6n, supra note 30, at 1050 (making reference to the dependence on the "good faith of
the domestic law").
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trend towards granting complete priority is recognizable, but absolute legal certainty will
probably only be reached by constitutional reforms following the example of Argentina
and Paraguay.40
4. The Difficulty of Ensuring the Uniformity of Community Law.
The above discussion shows that national judges are obliged to apply the law of the
MERCOSUR as internal law41 as long as its norms are sufficiently determined and are
self-executing in that they do not depend on any additional internal acts of concretiza-
tion. 42 But despite their internal binding force as a result of transformation, these norms
always retain their basic character as Community law because they were created for the
purpose of establishing identical rules for the common market.43 Since they form a new
uniform legal order of the Community, they have to be applied in a uniform way.
In practical terms, all integrational efforts depend upon the important and difficult
task of finding a mechanism for implementing and guaranteeing uniformity.44 The diffi-
culty of finding such a mechanism is multiplied by the inherent risk of fragmentation
and lack of coherence because of the peculiarities of national legal traditions and con-
cepts that are applied on a daily basis by national authorities.4 5 Without the cohesive
powers of uniform application, there is always the imminent threat that the Community
law will be degraded to a mere common historical source of diverging national regulation
in the inevitable and even necessary process of further development. 46 Legal scholars
agree that, because of this threat, there is an unconditional need to guarantee uniform
40. Id. On the other hand, in Germany, for example, the transformed conventional international
law also only assumes the rank of the transforming internal act, and the specific hierarchy of
the European Community law as displacing national law is, as a matter of principle, only
derived from the very nature of the act of transferring sovereign powers to a supranational
institution. See, e.g., BVerfG (June 6, 1971) 31 BVerfGE 145, 173-174 (1972); see generally JOSEF
ISENSEE & PAUL KIRCHHOF, 3 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS 311-12 (2d ed., Heidelberg 1996).
This reasoning is still not possible in the MERCOSUR. This situation and the similar one in
Italy have caused some doubts as to the legal certainty in the past. Cf Gaudet, supra note 29, at
58.
41. Cf. Elena I. Highton & Susana E. Lambois, Unificaci6n y efectividad del Derecho en los Paises del
Mercosur, 6 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO Y COMUNITARIo 433, 442-43 (1996).
42. See, e.g., Arbuet Vignali, supra note 35, at 177 et seq. and Gelsi Bidart, supra note 35, at 62. In
Argentina, see "Ekmekdjian" C.S., [1992-C] L.L. 540, 548; Pefta, supra note 2, at 457-58 (relat-
ing to "Cafes La Virginia' see supra note 27).
43. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
44. Cassagne, supra note 16, at 877; Lagrange, supra note 18, at 59.
45. Jorge Bustamante Alsina, Aproximaci6n de la Legislaci6n Interna Entre Estados que Integran una
Comunidad Regional - El Mercosur y la Comunidad Europea, [ 1992-C] L.L. 1158, 1159; see also
Lagrange, supra note 18, at 59 (describing European Community law); see generally KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCCION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 (3d ed., Oxford 1998); Klaus P.
Berger, Entstehungsgeschichte und Leitlinien des Neuen Deutschen Schiedsverfahrensrechts, in
DAS NEUE RECHT DER SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 1, 33-34 (K6ln 1998) and Andrew Rogers,
Contemporary Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, 17 INT'L Bus. LAW. 154, 155
(1989) (showing the similar constellation of the uniform arbitration laws based on the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration).
46. See infra note 152 (demonstrating the importance of a uniform evolution of the Commuity law).
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application, especially the uniform interpretation of the Community law of the MERCO-
SUR by national courts.
4 7
a. The Absence of a Supranational Court.
So far, there is no solution in sight as to how uniformity is to be achieved in reality.
The vast majorities of legal scholars realize the problem but merely conclude that a solu-
tion for this demanding task is a supranational court with a centralized and binding com-
petence of interpretation, following the model of the European Court of Justice. 48
At the present stage of integration such an institution is not legally feasible because it
would require supranationality.49 At the same time, the MERCOSUR as an economic
47. See, e.g., Paulo Borba Casella, Modalidades de Harmonizafao, Unificafdo e Uniformiza¢do do
Direito - 0 Brasil e as Convencfes Interamericanas de Direito Internacional Privado, in
INTEGRA4;AO JURIDICA INTERAMERICANA - As CONVENQOES INTERAMERICANAS (CIDIP'S) E 0
DIREITO BRASILEIRo 77, 100 (Nadia de Aratijo eds., Sao Paulo 1998); Jorge Luis Tosi, Las Fuentes
Juridicas de la Integraci6n, 11998-61 REv. DER. MERCOSUR 57, 58 (1998); Caetano Lagrastra
Neto, Mercosul e Integra~do Legislativa: 0 Papel da Magistratura, 742 R.T. 102, 108 (1997);
Highton & Lambois, supra note 41, at 445; Alegria, supra note 18, at 843; Ricardo J. Papafto,
Mercosur: Armonizacidn Legislativa y Derecho Comunitario, [ 1994-A] L.L. 706, 710; PAuLO R. DE
ALMEIDA, 0 MERCOSUL NO CONTEXTO REGIONAL E INTERNACIONAL 98 (Sao Paulo 1993); Dasso,
supra note 2, at 1253.
48. See, e.g., Tosi, supra note 47, at 58; Jilrgen Samtleben, Perspectivas para un Tribunal del Mercosur
y la Experiencia Europea, [1998-I] J.A. 796, 801; Lagrastra Neto, supra note 47, at 108; Highton
& Lambois, supra note 41, at 445; Alegria, supra note 18, at 843; Papafio, supra note 47, at 710;
ALMEIDA, supra note 47, at 98; Lavopa, supra note 18, at 911; see also Atilo A. Alterini, La
Supremacia Jurdica en el Mercosur, [1995-El L.L. 848, 851 (quoting the Recommendation by
the First Meeting of the Supreme Courts of the Region Buenos Aires, Aug. 1991). But see Pefia,
supra note 2, at 463 (hoping for a solution by the Protocol of Brasilia); Cf Symposium, Dispute
Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening Integration:
NAFTA and MERCOSUR?, 17 J. INT'L L. Bus. 850,898 (1996-1997).
49. See supra note 13. Until now, the delegation of sovereign powers to a supranational organization
is only safeguarded legally in Argentina by article 75 Nr. 24 of its Constitution, see supra note 30,
as well as in Paraguay by article 1451 of the Constitution, which states "La Republica del
Paraguay, en condiciones de igualdad con otros Estados, admite un orden juridico supranacional
que garantice la vigencia de los derechos humanos, de la paz, de la justicia, de la cooperaci6n y
del desarrollo, en lo politico, econ6mico, social y cultural:' According to Rodriguez Olivera, supra
note 18, at 46, this possibility allegedly is affirmed by the scholars in Uruguay by means of a gen-
erous interpretation of article 6 of the Constitution ("La repfiblica procurard la integraci6n social
y econ6mica de los Estados Latinoamericanos, especialmente en los que se refiere a la defensa
comfin de sus productos y materias primas. Asimismo, propenderd a la efectiva comple-
mentaci6n de sus servicios ptiblicos:') Olivera, supra note 18, at 46. See also Ruben Correa Freitas,
La Primacia del Derecho Comunitario Sobre la Constituci6n de los Estados Miembros, 111 L.I.U.
111, 118 (1995); but see Labandera Ipata, supra note 2, at 69. In Brazil, this is not deemed possible
due to a lack of corresponding legislative competence (articles 22, 23 & 24 of the Federal
Constitution), calling for a constitutional reform; Mid6n, supra note 30, at 1049; but see Adriana
Dreyzin de Klor & Teresita Saracho Cornet, La Eficacia de las Sentencias en un Espacio Integrado,
[1996-A] L.L. 1570, 1573 & n.10 (misinterpreting the Federal Constitution of Brazil, art. 4 "pdr-
rafo (mico"). See infra note 66. ButseeTJSP, 19.05.1998,256 R.T. DD.MM.1998, p. 123, supra note
38, at 126 (stating that the International Tribunal will be installed).
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reality is already in full action. The urgent need for a stable legal framework to facilitate
economic relations in the emerging Common Market cannot wait until the Member
States eventually agree on the transfer of sovereign power to a supranational institution. 50
A court of the MERCOSUR could not and should not take over the entire load of
application and interpretation of Community law. Even in the European Community
with the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, it was clear from the very beginning that every
national judge also has to be a Community judge.51 The judge is in charge of consolidat-
ing legal uniformity and coherence in its horizontal territorial dimension 52 and needs to
be provided with an effective tool capable of guaranteeing uniform application and con-
struction of the Community law even without supranational guidance.
53
b. The Uniform Interpretation as a Legal Obligation.
A method of construction that could be applied by a judge of a future Community
court would be a tool that would provide a method of uniform interpretation. The obser-
vance of such a unitarian method will largely depend first on the conviction of the
respective national organs,54 and second, on a corresponding genuine legal obligation
that could justify abandoning traditional domestic concepts. 55 The treaties of the MER-
COSUR do not include explicit, special clauses that impose such an obligation on nation-
50. Cf. HAROLDO PABST, MERCOSUL - DIREITO DA INTEGRACAO 142 (reprint of 1st ed., Rio de
Janeiro 1998) (1997) (hoping for a solution by the respective private international laws).
51. MALCOLM A. JARVIS, THE APPLICATION OF EC LAW BY NATIONAL COURTS: THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
GOODS 1 (Oxford 1998); Gaudet, supra note 29, at 56-57; see also Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos,
1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105, supra note 14, at 26-27.
52. See Casella, supra note 47, at 100; ADRIANA DREYZIN DE KLOR, EL MERCOSUR - GENERADOR DE
UNA NUEVA FUENTE DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 189 (Buenos Aires 1997); ROBERTO
DROMI ET AL., DERECHO COMUNITARIO - R8GIMEN DEL MERCOSUR 181 (Buenos Aires 1995) (sup-
porting the MERCOSUR); JARVIS, supra note 51, at 2 (supporting the European Community);
see generally 3 WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER
DARSTELLUNG 789 (Tiibingen 1976); H. Mosler, L'application du Droit International Public par
les Tribunaux Nationaux, 91 RECUEIL DE COURs 619, 679 (1957 I). JAN KROPHOLLER,
INTERNATIONALES EINHEITSRECHT 236 (T~bingen 1975) ("The less legal unity is secured by orga-
nizational means, the more this aim has to be considered when finding of justice is to be found
by judges.") TJSP 19.05.1998, 756 R.T. DD.MM.1998, p.125, supra note 38, at 126 ("Until [the
installation of the International Tribunal] happens, it is important that the judges feel the
necessity to prudently bring together the instruments which aim at conflicts of the interna-
tional market [referring to the MERCOSUR], thus creating a line of authority which guide the
efficient and agile aims of the [legal] procedures:').
53. A parallel situation exists to the corresponding necessities when applying uniform law based
on international treaties or model laws. Cf Berger, supra note 45, at 33; FRANK DIEDRICH, DIE
AUTONOME AUSLEGUNG VON INTERNATIONALEM EINHEITSRECHT 109-10 (Baden-Baden 1994);
TILLMANN SCHMIDT-PARZEFALL, DIE AUSLEGUNG DES PARALLEL-OBEREINKOMMENS VON LUGANO 57
(Ttlbingen 1995).
54. Cf JARVIS, supra note 51, at 3; see also TJSP 19.05.1998, supra note 52.
55. Cf Bayer, supra note 17, at 624.
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al judges. 56 This only leaves the possibility of referring to the basic intent to create a uni-
form legal order for the Member States, 57 as laid down in article 1 of the Treaty of
Asunci6n. This provision not only manifests the intention of the parties, but constitutes
the clear obligation of the Member States to "harmonize their legislation in the relevant
areas" in order to strengthen the integration process.58
Even more to the point is article 38 of the POP, which requires the parties to "adopt
all necessary means to assure in their respective territories the compliance with the norms
originating from the organs of the MERCOSUR." 59 In light of the missing supranational
powers of these organs, the term "norms" should not only be interpreted as including the
acts referred to in article 41 111 of the POP, but also the agreements regulated by article 41
II of the POP, considering these agreements are also regularly approved in the form of
Decisions of the CMC.60 From this follows the genuine legal obligation of each Member
State to guarantee the uniform interpretation of Community law. This is a compelling
task that should be primarily assumed by the domestic courts to avoid the Member State's
responsibility for a breach of its international obligations.61
The same follows from the very essence of Community law. Private parties are granted
certain rights in their communitarian dimension that are of special significance for their eco-
nomic interests. 62 Otherwise, there would be no justification for a regulation on the level of
the Community.63 Because the private individual can invoke these rights only in front of the
56. See, e.g., the corresponding duty of article 18 of the European Convention of Rome on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980) as manifested in article 36 of the German Law of
Introduction to the Civil Code; see also DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 112; Alejandro Garro,
Armonizaci6n y Unificaci6n del Derecho Privado en America Latina, 89 RDJ I 11, 23 (1992);
Bayer, supra note 17, at 625.
57. Bayer, supra note 17, at 624.
58. See Tratado deAsuncion, supra note 3, at 1045.
59. Art. 38 POP ("Los Estados Partes se comprometerin a adoptar las medidas necesarias para ase-
gurar, en sus respectivos territorios, el cumplimiento de las normas emanadas de los 6rganos
del MERCOSUL...").
60. See supra note 10.
61. Cf "Cafes La Virginia' C.S. (Arg.) Oct. 13, 1994, [1995-D] L.L. 275, 283-84 (Boggiano, J.);
"Ekmekdjian" C.S. [1992-C] L.L. 540, 548; Dasso, supra note 2, at 1253; Alfred von Overbeck,
L'application par le Juge Interne des Conventions de Droit International Privi, 132 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 40, 71 (1971); Bayer, supra note 17, at 624. See, accordingly, the corresponding inter-
pretation of the Treaty of the European Community by the E.C.J. Case 26/62, Van Gend &
Loos, 163 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105, supra note 14, at 26-27.
62. The economic freedom in a common market is an especially important reason for foreign
investors to start businesses in the MERCOSUR and thus voluntarily subject themselves to its
legal order. Cf Pefla, supra note 2, at 454 (advocating a "right to unrestricted access to the mar-
kets, protected by the law").
63. The "Principle of Subsidiarity" is based on the fundamental assumption that a state party to an
international treaty is never willing to concede more rights than is absolutely necessary, and
there has to be a clear necessity to regulate a certain question on the Community level. See
infra note 72; compare also Treaty on European Union (as consolidated according to the Treaty
of Amsterdam) Feb. 7, 1992, arts. 3b and 5, O.J. C224/1 (1992) 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
"The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
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national courts, it is necessary to concede a further reaching right of a fundamental nature to
have the granted Community rights applied and interpreted in a uniform way. This right has
to correspond to the genuine obligation of the deciding national judge.64
Lastly, this obligation to apply and interpret the Community law uniformly also
derives from a purely domestic point of view. By enacting the Community law as domes-
tic law, the legislator manifested his will to give effect to the process of integration and
legal harmonization, thus implicitly ordering its uniform application.6 5 This becomes
even more evident in light of the so-called clauses of integration found in the constitu-
tions of the Member States of the MERCOSUR. 66
Corresponding with the nature of the Community law itself, the method to be
applied will have to be autonomous and free of any respective national peculiarities and
traditions.67 But, paradoxically, it will have to be synthesized from the national legal tra-
ditions to be truly a method all legal systems of the Community can have in common
without which broad acceptance by all Member States could not be guaranteed. 68 These
postulates should be coherent with a possible fundamental pattern of any uniform law.
The emergence of a legal order of new quality exceeds the mere sum of its components.
This may have a synergetic effect by adding the new dimension of uniform community
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of this Treaty."
Treaty on European Union, art. 3b.
64. Cf. Dasso, supra note 2, at 1253; see generally Adroaldo F. Fabricio, A Prejudicialidade de Direito
Comunitdrio Nos Tribunais Supranacionais, 339 R.F. 3, 19 (1997). Considering the "implied
powers" theory and the lack of a supranational presence with the competence of binding inter-
pretatory powers, one could even speak of a fundamental Community right, since the homo-
geneous application is the conditio sine qua non for enjoying any Community rights; see also
Bayer, supra note 17, at 633 (stipulating a private claim for legal certainty concerning the appli-
cation of an international treaty).
65. Cf. Baptista, supra note 18, at 37.
66. See id. (referring to the programmatical article 4 "pdrrafo tnico" of the Brazilian Federal
Constitution: "A Rep6blica Federativa do Brasil buscard a integraqio econ6mica, politica,
social e cultural dos povos da America Latina, visando formaqo de uma comunidade latino-
americana de naq6es."); see Mid6n, supra note 30, at 1039 (describing the clauses of integration
in the other Member States. By contrast, such clauses cannot be found in the constitutions of
the associated countries Chile and Bolivia.
67. See Casella, supra note 47, at 88; see also KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 235 et seq. (elaborating
in detail the exigency of autonomy underlying the method of interpretation of international
uniform law).
68. See Casella, supra note 47, at 103; cf. DIEGO P. FERNANDEZ ARROYO, LA CODIFICACION DEL
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO EN AMtRICA LATINA 51 (1994); see also DIEDRICH, supra note
53, at 110 (describing conventional international uniform law); Berger, supra note 45, at 33 et
seq. (describing uniform law based on the model laws); see generally ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra
note 45, at 21.
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and interdependence to the individual national experiences. In summary, the traditional
individual concepts of legal construction will have to serve as the starting point by which
coinciding foundations will have to be detached from their limited scope and adapted to
that new quality.69
B. CLASSICAL CANONS OF INTERPRETATION AND THEIR LIMITATIONS.
In accordance with the "double nature" of unified legal norms, this analysis will focus
on the rules for interpreting international treaties as well as individual national rules of
interpretation.
70
1. Interpretation in the Public International Law.
The principles of construction of international treaties are laid down in articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which have acquired the status
of customary law.71 Their main characteristic is to consider primarily the situation of
negotiation between sovereign nations that want to regulate their legal relationships by
way of compromise. This includes the basic assumption that the contracting parties will
accept limitations on their rights only to the least possible extent.72 Therefore, the para-
mount rule is the supremacy of the parties' will, as suggested primarily by the wording of
the treaty (article 31 I of the Vienna Convention). 73 Every international treaty should,
therefore, be interpreted autonomously in order to respect its contractual nature.
74
However, these rules do not sufficiently acknowledge the fact that the unified
Community law has less impact on the states as sovereign contracting parties than on the
legal relations of private parties.75 In daily application, few differences exist between the
Community law and domestic regulations, except for the former's larger territorial juris-
diction. Therefore, the national methods of legal construction should be, in principle,
69. Cf. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 45, at 21; Casella, supra note 47, at 103; see also Marcus Lutter,
Die Auslegung angeglichenen Rechts, 47 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 593, 598 (1992) (analyzing the simi-
lar procedure of the E.C.J.); see infra note 65.
70. See DROMI ET AL., supra note 52, at 182 (suggesting both sets of rules be applied cummulative-
ly). See also Lutter, supra note 69, at 598 (differentiating with respect to the European
Community law). See generally FIKENTSCHER, supra note 52, at 789; KROPHOLLER, supra note 52,
at 236-37; Bayer, supra note 17, at 629 et seq.; Bayer, supra note 17 (for the double nature of
unified laws).
71. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 656 (4th ed. 1997); see also Territorial dispute between
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 21-22 (Feb. 3); Maritime
Delimination and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1995
I.C.J. 6, 18 (Feb. 15). Cf Bayer, supra note 17, at 620 et seq. (for coinciding customary interna-
tional law before the entrance into force of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
72. Cf Bayer, supra note 17, at 620-2 1.
73. See, e.g., Cafes La Virginia, C.S., Oct. 13, 1994, [1995-D] L.L. 275, 278 (Arg.); C.S., Jan. 5, 1987,
84 RDJ 11-5 11, 13 (1987) (Chile); C.A. Santiago, May 24, 1988, 85 RDJ 11-5 172, 174 (1988)
(Chile) (considering the "objetivos que Ilevaron a la suscripci6n" in conformity with the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). See generally FIKENTSCHER, supra note 52, at 788.
74. Cf DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 110.
75. See KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 236; cf. Bayer, supra note 17, at 630 et seq. (providing a
detailed critique of the rules of international public law with respect to uniform law).
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more relevant than the methods of interpretation for rules applicable between states.76
Moreover, the latter lack the systematic context that is an essential part of any process of
integration leading to a complex legal order. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the
international character of Community law, in formal and practical terms, emphasizes its
cross-border dimension. It is therefore important to recognize the autonomy of the inter-
pretation, considering that the ratio conventionis is part of the international treaties
aspired, free of national peculiarities that would be inconsistent with uniformity.77
2. Interpretation in the Context of the National Legal Orders.
To pay tribute to the "plus" that qualifies and promotes the Community law vis-a-vis
the public international law, the national concepts of construction have to be analyzed
and compared. The purpose of this analysis is to extract their common core in order to
guarantee their desirable general acceptance. 78 In light of the comparative law method, it
is important to notice beforehand that all the countries of the MERCOSUR belong to the
Romanistic legal family79 and, with the exception of Brazil, their origins can be traced to
the genuine legal unity of the former Spanish Empire.8 0 Yet, for the question of method-
ology, it is of paramount importance to note that the methodological doctrines of the
German scholar Savigny and those derived from his thoughts have strongly guided legal
scholarship in all these countries.8 1 This leads to the comforting situation (of course only
76. See Lutter, supra note 69, at 598; Bayer, supra note 17, at 633; see also Cassagne, supra note 16,
at 877 (especially for the Treaty of Asunci6n).
77. See DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 110; KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 237. See also Casella, supra
note 67, at 88.
78. Cf Garro, supra note 56, at 28.
79. See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 45, at 113 et seq.; see also 1 WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER,
METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG 581-82 (1975); Garro, supra note 56,
at 24 et seq. (for the legal history of Latin American private law); Josd L. de los Mozos,
Perspectivas y M~todo para la Comparaci6n Juridica en Relaci6n Con el Derecho Privado
Iberoamericano, 60 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 773, 776 et seq. (1976).
80. See Garro, supra note 56, at 24, 28; Hugo Tagle Martinez, Derecho e Integraci6n Internacional, 12
REvisTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 443, 444 (1985) (describing the modern process of integration in
Latin America as the inversion of the original desintegration of the former Spanish colonies).
81. See, e.g., MARIA H. DINIZ, COMPENDIO DE INTRODUqAO A CIENCIA DO DIREITO 383 etseq. (2d ed.,
Sdo Paulo 1989); 1 MIGUEL M. DE SERPA LOPES, COMENTARIOSA LEI DE INTRODUCAO AO CODIGO
CIVIL 115 etseq. (2d ed., Sio Paulo 1959); CLOVIS BEVILAQUA, TEORIA GERAL DO DIREITO CIVIL 45
et seq. (reprint 1975) (1908); Rtibens Limongi Franqa, Hermeneutica e Interpretaoo do Direito
Positivo, in 41 ENCICLOPEDIA SARAIVA DO DIREITO 145, 152-53 (1980) (referencing GENY, whose
methods of interpretation (donnies) were massively influenced by the German Pandektisten,
that is, Savigny in the long run); Cf. FIKENTSCHER, supra note 79, at 467-471. In Argentina, see
ENRIQUE AFTALION ET AL., INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO 423 et seq. (12th ed. 1984); F.A. TORRES
LACROZE & GUILLERMO P. MARTIN, MANUAL DE INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO 350 et seq. (4th ed.
1983). In Chile, see CARLOS DUCCI CLARO, "Interpretaci6n juridica" 130 (3d ed. 1989) (describ-
ing the influence of Savigny on Bello, the "father" of the Chilean CC); FERNANDO FUEYO LANERI,
INTERPRETACION Y JUEz 52 (Santiago de Chile 1974); Luis CLARO SOLAR, EXPLICACIONES DE
DERECHO CIVIL CHILENO Y COMPARADO 124 (reprint 1931) (1898). In Uruguay, see EDUARDO
JIMENEZ DE AR8CHAGA, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO, 113 et seq. (2d ed. 1987). In Paraguay, see
JUAN JOSE SOLER, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO PARAGUAYO 527 (1954). In Bolivia, see Jose A.
OLGUIN ESTRADA, INTRODUCCION AL ESTUDIO DE DERECHO 332-33 (2d ed. 1982).
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for a continental lawyer) that the hermeneutical concepts in these countries are complete-
ly based on the traditional and well-settled continental methods, known today as the clas-
sical four canons of interpretation: 82 the grammatical, the systematic, the historical, and
the teleological interpretation. 83 Court decisions, as well as works of the legal scholars,
and partially even the legislations of the individual Member States of the MERCOSUR
and of the associated countries, reflect these canons of interpretation. 84
a. The Statutory Rules of Legal Construction.
In Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, judges charged with interpreting
statutory law are guided by explicit rules in the introductory chapters of the civil codes or
respectively in the law of introduction of the Civil Code. 85 These statutory rules are par-
tially accepted as generally valid for all laws. 86 Still, except for Chile, whose pertinent
chapter is quite detailed, and Brazil, these legal provisions do not receive much attention
in the decisions of their respective courts. 87 Instead, courts and scholars seem to follow a
somewhat independent method of construction, largely referring to the classical canons
of interpretation. 88
82. See FIKENTSCHER, supra note 52, at 37 et seq., 101 et seq., 668 et seq. (detailing the development
from Savigny to Ihering, who added the objective-teleological component to the present sys-
tem in Europe).
83. See also KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 263 et seq.; Lutter, supra note 69, at 598 et seq.; DIEDRICH,
supra note 53, at 110 et seq.; Berger, supra note 45, at 34-35, which all take these canons as the
basis for the elaboration of their rules of interpretation for their respective variations of the
uniform law.
84. In South America, the dispute concerning the different schools of legal hermeneutics is still
debated passionately between scholars. The courts pay no regard to these schools, therefore,
corresponding to the purely practical aim of this study, they will not be considered here. For
details, see, e.g., in Brazil, Jorge Lobo, Interpretafdo do Direito Comercial, 337 R.F. 95, 96 et seq.
(1997); in Argentina, see AFrALION & GARCIA OLANO & VILANOVA, supra note 81, at 415 et seq.;
in Chile, see Ducci CLARO, supra note 81, at 20 et seq.; in Uruguay, see JIMENEZ DE AR9CHAGA,
supra note 81, at 114 etseq.
85. See in Brazil, art. 5 of the Law Introduction to the Civil Code ("Lei de Introduqdo ao C6digo
Civil' hereinafter LICC); in Argentina, art. 16 of the Civil Code ("C6digo Civil:' hereinafter
CC); in Chile, arts. 19-24 CC; in Uruguay, arts. 17-20 (corresponding literally to arts. 19-22 I
CC in Chile); in Paraguay, art. 62 CC (corresponding literally to art. 16 CC in Argentina).
86. See, e.g., in Brazil, with reference to article 5 LICC: STF, 06.01.1993, D.J.U. 1.7.1983, p. 9998;
STJ, 04.16.1998, D.J.U. 1.6.1998, p. 141; STJ, 06.26.1997, D.J.U. 29.9.1997, p. 48180; STJ,
04.14.1997, D.J.U. 12.5.1997, p. 18808; in Chile, see C.A. Santiago (Aug. 5, 1990) 88 RDJ 11-5
81, 85 (1991) (detailing rules of arts. 19-24 CC). But see JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA, supra note 81, at
126 (indicating a different situation in Uruguay).
87. See, e.g., in Chile C.S., Jan. 25, 1995, 92 RDJ I-i 7, 9 (Chile); C.S., Oct. 25, 1913, 12 RDJ 94, 105
(1915) (Chile) (applying the statutory provisions even on international treaties); see also C.A.
Santiago, Oct. 5, 1990, 88 RDJ II-5 81, 85 (1991) (Chile). For the origins in the Civil Code of
Louisiana of 1825, see also CLARO SOLAR, supra note 81, at 124; Ducci CLARO, supra note 81, at
95 & 249. For Brazil, see STF, 08.29.1967, 43 RTJ 47, 48 (1968); STJ, 04.16.1998, D.J.U. 1.6.1998,
p. 141; see also supra note 86. In Uruguay, see C.I. (Feb. 29, 1980) 11 Anuario de Derecho Civil
Uruguayo 56 (1980).
88. Limongi Franga, supra note 81, at 152 & 153 (distinguishing between the statutory rules of
interpretation and the scientific rules of interpretation developed by courts and scholars).
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b. The Grammatical Interpretation.
In Chile and Uruguay, interpretation on the basis of the literal wording of the norms
is emphasized by the law.89 In Argentina and Paraguay, this rule ranks first.90 By contrast,
this method is not mentioned in the Brazilian and Bolivian statutes. Nevertheless, all
these countries recognize that the literal sense of the provisions must be the starting point
and a clear point of reference of any hermeneutical analysis.9 1
c. The Systematic Interpretation.
In the legislation in Chile and Uruguay, the contextual logic within the statute and
the presumption in favor of correspondence and harmony between its provisions is stated
as the basis of the systematic interpretation. 92 In Chile, reference is also made to the con-
89. Based on the Roman principle in claris cessit interpretatio, article 19 CC in Chile and the almost
identical article 17 CC in Uruguay state: "Cuando el sentido de la ley es claro, no se desatender6
su tenor literal, a pretexto de consultar su espiritu. Pero bien se puede, para interpretar una
expresi6n obscura de la ley, recurrir a su intenci6n o espiritu, claramente manifestada en ella
misma ...." But see C.S., Jan. 25, 1995, 92 RDJ 11-1 7, 9 (1995) (Chile) (argumentum e
contrario, that one can not adhere to the wording where the word's literal sense is not evident);
accord DuccI CLARO, supra note 81, at 101 et seq.; CLARO SOLAR, supra note 81, at 124; see also
C.S., Oct. 25, 1913, 12 RDJ 94, 104 (1915) (Chile) (taking article 19 CC to confirm that the
clear wording is a restriction to any interpretation even for an international treaty).
90. See art. 16 CC (Arg.) and the almost literally coinciding art. 62 CC (Para.) ("Si una cuestion no
puede resolverse por las palabras ni el espiritu de la ley, se atenderd a las leyes antlogas... ").
91. In Brazil, see STJ, 08.28.1998, D.J.U. 21.9.1998, p. 250; STJ, 03.19.1998, D.J.U. 6.4.1998, p. 74.
For its limits see STJ, 04.1.1997, D.J.U. 26.5.1997, p. 22530; see also Lobo, supra note 84, at 102;
DINIZ, supra note 81, at 387; Limongi Franqa, supra note 81, at 147 f. In Argentina, C.S. (Feb.
10, 1998) [1998-B] L.L. 472, 479; C.S. (Feb. 14, 1997) [1998-B] L.L. 326, 329 (Petracchi, J., dis-
senting); C.S. (July 2, 1996) [1997-B] L.L. 403, 404 (with many references). See also C.S., Sept.
25, 1997, [1998-A] L.L. 334, 339 & 341 (Arg.) (for the limits of the grammatical interpreta-
tion); CNFed. Cont. Adm., Feb. 25 1997, [1998-A] L.L. 271, 274 (Arg.) (with further refer-
ences). Martin Lopez Olaciregui, Pautas Doctrinarias Sobre la Hermeneutica Jurfdica, [1994-IV]
J.A. 756, 757-58 (1994); Marcelo J. Lopez Mesa, Interpretaci6n de la Ley, [1996-A] L.L. 1117,
1120 et seq. (referencing to relevant court decisions). In Chile, see C.S., May 4, 1991, 88 RDJ II-
5 216, 219 (1991) (Chile); see also references in supra note 89. Furthermore, the special provi-
sions in articles 20 und 21 CC concerning legal definitions are to be respected; Noveno Juzgado
de Letras en lo Civil de Santiago (May 29, 1992) 89 RDJ 11-5 328, 329 (1992); C.A. Santiago,
Oct. 5, 1997, 94 RDJ 11-2 94, 95 (1997) (Chile) (on the use of the Diccionario de la Real
Academia as a source of the natural sense of a term); Ducci CLARO, supra note 81, at 100 et seq.
(further references). In Uruguay, S.C.J., Aug. 4, 1982, 13 Anuario de Derecho Civil Uruguayo 56
(1982) (Uru.) (establishing limits); Juzgado Letrado de Primera Instancia en lo Contensio
administrativo, Mar. 23, 1992, 107 LJU 1118, 119 (1993) (Uru.). See also JIM9NEZ DE AR8CHAGA,
supra note 81, at 118. In Paraguay, see SOLER, supra note 81, at 527. In Bolivia, see JAIME
Moscoso DELGADO, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO 392 (1st reprint of 4th ed., 1989) (1987) (rec-
ommending that for obscure terms reference be made, inter alia, to the significance attributed
to them in the Bible); OLGuIN ESTRADA, supra note 81, at 33 1.
92. Article 22 I CC (Chile) and the practically identical article 20 CC (Uru.) state that "El contexto
de la ley servird para ilustrar el sentido de cada una de sus partes, de manera que haya entre
ellas la debida correspondencia y armonia." See also Ducci CLARO, supra note 81, at 130 et seq.
(speaking of the "logic element of interpretation").
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textual dependence with other laws. 93 In Argentina and Paraguay, this concept can only
be presumed as part of the general reference to the "spirit of the law"'94 which has to be
understood as a generic term for all methods of interpretation beyond the literal wording.
In the practical interpretation of the law, courts and scholars emphasize the need to har-
monize individual provisions with the norms surrounding them systematically as well as
with the entire legal order.95
93. Article 22 II CC states that "Los pasajes obscuros de una ley pueden ser ilustrados por medio
de otras leyes, particularmente si versan sobre el mismo asunto." See also Ducci CLARO, supra
note 81, at 141 et seq. (calling this the "sytematic element of interpretation"). But see C.S., Jan.
16, 1997, 94 RDJ II-1 10, 11 (Chile) (calling this method of interpretation just one option of
interpretation offered to the judge that he can accept or not).
94. See supra note 90.
95. In Brazil, see, e.g., STF, 09.05.1998, 162 RTJ 726 (1997); STF, 09.08.1998, D.J.U. 27.10.1994, p.
29165; STF, 08.29.1989, D.J.U. 15.9.1989, p. 14511; STF, 08.29.1967, 43 RTJ 47, 48 (1968). STJ,
04.14.1998, D.J.U. 31.8.1998, p. 68; STJ, 09.22.1997, D.JU. 3.11.1997, p. 56299; STJ, 05.08.1997,
D.J.U. 16.6.1997, p. 27318; STJ, 11.13.1996, D.J.U. 10.3.1997, p. 5892; STJ, 04.23.1996, D.J.U.
12.8.96, p. 27483; STL 06.17.1996, D.J.U. 12.8.1996, p. 27456; STJ, 10.10.1994, D.JU. 19.12.1994,
p. 35322; STI, 03.22.1994, D.J.U. 25.4.1994, p. 9279; STJ, 10.25.1993, D.J.U. 22.11.1993, p. 24905;
STJ, 06.02.1993, D.J.U. 18.10.1993, p. 21845; STJ, 03.17.1992, D.J.U. 13.4.1992, p. 5001. STJ,
09.09.1998, supra note 38, at 159 deserves special attention. According to this decision the norm
has to by interpreted also in the systematic context of the international obligations resulting from
the GATT (in case of doubt, probably in conformity with the treaty, cf. supra at note 38); see also
TJ Sao Paulo (May 19, 1998), supra note 38, at 126 (clarifying that the domestic norm is subject
to a consenting interpretation with the present implementation of the MERCOSUR); see also
Ant6nio Elias de Queiroga, Interpretaedo e aplicafao do Direito, 740 R.T. 733, 734-35 (1997);
Lobo, supra note 84, at 102; DINIZ, supra note 81, at 389; Limongi Franqa, supra note 81, at 148. In
Argentina, see C.S., Sept. 25, 1997, [1998-A] L.L. 334, 339 (Arg.) (further references); C.S., May 6,
1997, [1998-C] L.L. 357 (Arg.); C.S., July 2, 1996, [1997-B] L.L. 403, 404 (Arg.) (with further ref-
erences); C.S., Oct. 13, 1994, [1995-D] L.L. 275, 279 (Arg.) (including also the interpretation in
conformity with the Constitution); CNCiv, June 23, 1995, [1997-C] L.L. 965 (Arg.); CNFed.
Cont. Adm., Feb. 25, 1997 [1998-A] L.L. 271, 274 (Arg.). The opinion of Justice Boggiano in C.S.,
Oct. 13, 1994, [1995-D] L.L. 275, 288 (Arg.), deserves special attention. It states that the interna-
tional obligations of the State have to be taken in consideration in the systematic intepretation.
See also LOPEZ OLACIREGUI, supra note 91, at 758-59 and LOPEZ MESA, supra note 91, 1121 (further
references to courts' decisions). In Chile, see Tribunal Constitucional, Apr. 26, 1997, 94 RDJ 11-6
1, 18 (1997) (Chile) (for the constitutional context of a norm); C.S., Jan. 26, 1993, 90 RDJ 11-3 2,
9 (1993) (Chile); C.A. Santiago, Dec. 15, 1992,89 RDJ 11-2 193 (1992) (Chile); C.S., Nov. 3, 1992,
89 RDJ 11-5 333, 336 (1992) (Chile); C.S., Oct. 26, 1990, 88 RDJ Il-5 81, 85 (1991) (Chile). See
also Ducci CLARO, supra note 81, at 130 et seq., 141 et seq. (with numerous further references). In
Uruguay, see S.C.J., May 2, 1988, 96 LJU 1 360, 364 (1988) (Uru.) (for interpretation in conformi-
ty with the constitution); T.A.C., Feb. 12, 1996, 113 LJU I 371, 377 (1996) (Uru.), (applying this
method to an international treaty); Juzgado Letrado de Primera Instancia en lo Contensio
administrativo, Mar. 23, 1992, 107 LJU I 118, 120 (1993) (Uru.); see also JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA,
supra note 81, at 118. In Paraguay, see PANGRAZIO, supra note 30, at 103; SOLER, supra note 81, at
528 & 530-31 (expressly naming the comparative law as an important instrument of the system-
atic method). In Bolivia, see Moscoso DELGADO, supra note 91, at 393; OLGUIN ESTRADA, supra
note 81, at 332. See also article 4 of the "Ley del Tribunal Constitucional:' Ley 1836 of Apr. 1,
1998, (visited July 26, 1999) <http://www.congreso.gov.bo/71eyes/leyes/LEYN1836.html> (laying
down the interpretation of conformity with the constitution).
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d. The Historical Interpretation.
The "trustworthy history of the establishment" of a norm as a source for understand-
ing its meaning is accepted in the Chilean and Uruguayan statutes 96 and can again be
derived in Argentina and Paraguay from the expression "spirit of the law."97 The historical
interpretation is fairly accepted despite the rather scarce mentioning of this rule and par-
tial restrictions in the legal practice of some countries. Thus, the earlier solutions, which
served as models, the preparatory works, and the original understanding of the legislator,
may be considered when exploring the meaning of the provision. 98
e. The Teleological Interpretation.
The only explicit reference in the Brazilian legislation with regard to the teleological
interpretation is to the social aims and the exigencies of the common welfare aimed at by
a legal provision as criteria for unveiling its meaning.99 In contrast, in Chile and Uruguay,
the inherent aims of the regulations are tied in a seemingly restrictive way to the wording
of a provision and the history of its establishment.10 0 Finally, Argentina and Paraguay
96. See art. 19 CC (Chile) and the insofar identical art. 17 CC (Uru.) ("Pero bien se puede, para
interpretar una expresi6n obscura de la ley, recurrir a su intenci6n o espiritu, claramente man-
ifestada [...l en la historia fidedigna de su establecimiento.").
97. See supra note 89.
98. In Brazil, see STF, 11.28.1995, D.J.U. 1.3.1996, p. 5028; STF, 10.18.1994, D.J.U. 25.11.1994, p.
32312; STF, 05.19.1994, D.J.U. 22.11.1996, p. 45690. STJ, 06.01.1998, D.J.U. 1.6.1998, p. 141;
STJ, 12.15.1994, D.J.U. 24.4.1995, p. 10427; STJ, 03.22.1994, D.J.U. 25.4.1994, p. 9279. See also
Queiroga, supra note 95, at 735; Lobo, supra note 84, at 102; DINIZ, supra note 81, at 390;
Limongi Franqa, supra note 81, at 148. In Argentina, see C.S., Feb. 10, 1998, [1998-BI L.L. 472,
474 (Arg.) (invoking the established practice of the Supreme Court); C.S., Oct. 19, 1995,
[1996-D] L.L. 19, 21 (Arg.) (also with further references); C.S., Oct. 13, 1994, [1995-D] L.L.
275, 280 (Arg.) (pointing out the will of the ratifying legislator with respect to the interpreta-
tion of an international treaty). See also CNCiv, Apr. 20, 1995, 162 E.D. 593, 596 (1995) (Arg.)
(establishing that the practice of the courts and scholars developed for domestic regulations
can also be used for the interpretation of coinciding international). See also Lopez Olaciregui,
supra note 91, at 758; Lopez Mesa, supra note 91, at 1121 et seq. In Chile, see Tribunal
Constitucional, Apr. 26, 1997, 94 RDJ 11-6 1, 19 (1997) (Chile); C.S., Sept. 16, 1992,89 RDJ 11-5
279, 274 et seq. (1992) (Chile); C.S., May 23, 1959, 56 RDJ 207, 210 (1959) (Chile); C.S., Aug.
10, 1927, 25 RDJ lI-I 317, 334 (1928) (Chile). See also Ducci CLARO, supra note 81, at 125 et
seq. (collective references, critical of courts that allegedly do not limit themselves to consider
only the objective sense of the law as stipulated by article 192 CC, but also take into account
the subjective element of the mens legislatoris). In Uruguay, see S.C.J., May 2, 1988, 96 LJU I
360, 366 (1988) (Uru.) (restrictive); S.C.J., Aug. 4, 1982, supra note 91, at 56 (the restriction has
to be consistent with the literal sense and the systematic interpretion); see also C.J., Feb. 4,
1980, 11 Anuario de Derecho Civil Uruguayo 56 (1980); Juzgado Letrado de Primera Instancia
en lo Contensioadministrativo Montevideo, Mar. 23, 1992, 107 LJU 1 118, 119 (1993); JIMINEZ DE
ARECHAGA, supra note 81, at 117-18 (equally restrictive and calling the historical method mere-
ly supplementary). In Paraguay, see SOLER, supra note 81, at 529. In Bolivia, see OLGUIN
ESTRADA, supra note 81, at 332; cf Moscoso DELGADO, supra note 91, at 392.
99. See LICC, supra note 5, art. 5 ("Na aplica¢do da lei, o juiz atenderA aos fins sociais a que ela se
dirige e As exigencias do bern comum:').
100. See C.C. art. 192 (Chile) and C.C. art. 172 (Uru.) ("su intenci6n"). See also supra note 89.
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again only offer the generic term of the ratio legis.1o' Even though sometimes slightly
reduced to a counter-check by contrasting the legislator's original intentions with the
effects of the norm in practice-the inherent purpose of the norm-to be determined in
an objective way and seen within its present socio-economical setting, is recognized and
applied in all countries as a fundamental criterion of interpretation. 102
f. Evaluation of the Domestic Methods.
The domestic rules of interpretation do not seem too different from those of public
international law, and courts have in fact applied them in some cases of international law
in those countries. 10 3 Nevertheless, they are not capable of guaranteeing a uniform inter-
pretation of the Community law on their own. On one hand, national particularities have
evolved despite large similarities of concepts. 104 On the other hand, these do not address
the distinct quality of the communitarian legal order. Its uniformity would presuppose a
certain level of autonomy. Therefore, the adaptation and expansion of methodological
instruments is necessary and can build on the common concepts discovered by compara-
tive analysis. Favorable conditions exist for the autonomy of such a uniform method of
interpretation. Most countries have a slight preference for a literal legal interpretation and
101. See supra note 90.
102. In Brazil, see, e.g., STF, 04.03.1997, D.J.U. 23.5.1997, p. 21,731; STF, 18.12.1995, D.J.U.
08.03.1996, p. 6,222; STF, 26.09.1995, D.J.U. 17.11.1995, p. 39,218; STF, 30.05.1994, R.T.J.
161/674, 675 (1997), STF, 09.03.1993, D.J.U. 30.04.1993, p. 7,571. STJ, 16.04.1998, D.J.U.
01.06.1998, p. 141; STJ, 19.02.1998, D.J.U. 27.04.1998, p. 155; STJ, 09.12.1997, D.J.U.
14.09.1998, p. 69; STJ, 16.09.1997, D.J.U. 06.10.1997, p. 49,942; STJ, 10.09.1997, D.J.U.
24.11.1997, p. 61,092; STJ, 04.08.1997, D.J.U. 08.09.1997, p. 42,435; STJ, 25.02.1997, D.J.U.
26.5.1997, p. 22,531. See STF, 03.04.1997, 742 R.T. 166, 167 (1997) (interpreting art. 19 of the
Protocol of Las Lefias, invoking the significance of the effet utile in the meaning of "operative
value" for the interpretation of provisions of conventional international law, but also the limits
drawn by the constitution). See also DINIZ, supra note 81, at 390; Lobo, supra note 84, at 102. In
Argentina, see C.S., Feb. 10, 1998, [1998-B] L.L. 472, 474 (Arg.); C.S., Nov. 12, 1997, [1998-C]
L.L. 357 (Arg.); C.S., Sept. 25, 1997, [1998-A] L.L. 334, 339 (Arg.); CNFed.Cont.Adm., Feb. 25,
1997, [1998-Al L.L. 271, 274 (Arg.); CNCiv, June 23, 1995, [1997-C] L.L. 965 (Arg.). See gener-
ally Lopez Mesa, supra note 91, at 1121-22; Lopez Olaciregui, supra note 91, at 759. In Chile, see
C.S., May 23, 1959, 56 RDJ I-1 207, 210 (1959) (Chile); C.A. Santiago, May 12, 1993, 90 RDJ
11-3 94, 95 (1993) (Chile); C.S., July 7, 1992, 89 RDJ 11-5 201, 205 (1992) (Chile); C.S., Dec. 30,
1991,89 RDJ 11-5 51, 52 (1992) (Chile); C.S., May 4, 1991, 88 RDJ 11-5 216, 219 (1991) (Chile).
See also Ducci CLARO, supra note 81, at 111-12. In Uruguay, see S.C.J., May 2, 1988, 96 LJU I
360, 366 (1988) (Uru.); Tribunal en lo Contensioadministrativo, Apr. 21, 1993, 108 LJU I 389,
392 (1994) (Uru.); T.A.C., Mar. 1, 1993, 108 LJU 178, 79 (1994) (Uru.); T.A.P., July 29, 1988, 98
LJU I 229, 240 (1989) (Uru.). See also JIMENEZ DE ARtCHAGA, supra note 81, at 116 et seq. In
Paraguay, cf. SOLER, supra note 81, at 528-29 (treating this method, following Savigny, as the
"logical interpretation"); see also PANGRAZIO, supra note 30, at 103 (referring to the "persued
aim"). In Bolivia, see Moscoso DELGADO, supra note 91, at 392. Cf. OLGUIN ESTRADA, supra note
81, at 333.
103. See supra notes 95, 98, and 102.
104. See, e.g., supra note 98 (mentioning different views in the details regarding the historical inter-
pretation); supra note 102 (mentioning different views regarding teleological interpretation).
See also Bayer, supra note 17, at 632-33.
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show much sympathy for the discovery of the ratio legis.105 This corresponds to the inter-
nationally accepted ratio conventionis.10 6
C. MODIFICATIONS BY THE EXIGENCIES OF THE COMMUNITY LAW: OUTLINE OF A
UNIFORM INTERPRETATION IN THE MERCOSUR.
The following set of rules are designed as a uniform concept for interpreting the law
of the MERCOSUR. They try to solve the above mentioned paradox by considering both
the subjective requisite of a common basis firmly rooted in the respective legal orders as
well as the objective requisite of independence of the legal orders. 107 They also follow the
methods developed for the interpretation of conventional international uniform law and
the law of the European Community.'0 8
1. Autonomous Grammatical Interpretation.
The starting point should be the grammatical interpretation. In other words, the
wording of the communitarian norm in question needs to be clarified. This implies
searching for the natural notion of the relevant term, independent of its possible mean-
ings within the national legal traditions. The comparison of the Spanish and Portuguese
language versions is quite important because differences in these versions can be quite
revealing.109 A coherent Community-wide usage of certain specific terms, which exceeds
the natural meaning of the words, is likely to have evolved in only a very few cases
because the legal order of the MERCOSUR is still quite young. 10
2. Autonomous Systematic Interpretation.
In case a uniform legal definition does exist and an interpretation of the wording is
inconclusive, especially where ambiguities in the Spanish and the Portuguese texts
105. This has to be understood in contrast to the more subjective element of the ratio legislatoris.
The presented objectivist tendency already follows from the comparison of the pertinent
national provision regulating the interpretation. See supra notes 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, and 99. See
KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 259 (distinguishing between the objectivist and the subjectivist
view); KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 301-02 (5th ed. 1983); JIMCNEZ
DEARCCHAGA, supra note 81, at 114; Lobo, supra note 84, at 102.
106. See DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 110; KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 237; Casella, supra note 47,
at 88.
107. See supra notes 67 et seq.
108. See, e.g., KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 258 et seq.; DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 110 et seq.;
Lutter, supra note 69, at 598 et seq. (regarding the European law).
109. Cf Case C-236/97, Codan (Dec. 17, 1998) " 25; Case C-219/95, Ferriere Nord v. Comm'n, 1997
E.C.R. 1-4411, 4435, [1999] 5 C.M.L.R. 575 [1997 1 15; Case C-283/81, C.LL.F.L T v. Ministry
of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3430, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 472 [1983 1 18; JOCHEN ANWEILER, DIE
AUSLEGUNGSMETHODE DES GERICHTSHOFS DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 145 et seq. (1997)
(explaining the interpretation of a provision of Community law involving the comparison of
the different language versions thereof). See also Jtlrgen Samtleben, 1 DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
PRIVADO EN AMERICA LATINA 96 (1983) (interpreting the C6digo Bustamante).
110. For the concept of a unitarian Community-wide term and the possible discrepancies vis-A-vis
the national concepts, see Case C-283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T., 1982 E.C.R. 3415, at 3430, [1983] 1
C.M.L.R. 472 [1982] 5 19.
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exist, lthe meaning of the norm has to be explored by means of systematic interpreta-
tion.11 2 The regulative notions are to be elaborated in view of the overall structure of the
embedding instrument, that is, the agreement or the formal act of the MERCOSUR
forming the contextual logic. 113 Despite the still fragmentary nature of this legal order,
they also have to be seen in light of other regulatory works by the Community, which are
somehow linked to the matter in question, 114 as well as superior norms such as the con-
stituting treaties. 115 In contrast, the contextual consideration of national rules has to be
largely disregarded because of the postulated autonomy of Community law. 116
When interpreting parallel agreements with associated countries, a problem may arise
from the systematic consideration of other Community regulations.11 7 Because the associat-
ed countries are not bound by Community law (strictu sensu), it should, in principle, have
only very limited significance for the interpretation of parallel agreements.11 8 However, dif-
ferent interpretations of the largely identical parallel agreements would obstruct their inten-
tion to create homogeneous conditions in preparation of a future accession by the associated
111. See KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 266 et seq. (for the treatment of literal divergences in multi-
lingual texts of uniform laws). See also Samtleben, supra note 109, at 97.
112. Cf Case C-76/95, Kraaijeveld v. Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5403,
5443 5 28 (stating "the provision in question be interpreted by reference to the general scheme
of rules of the which it forms part"); Case C-149/97, Institute of the Motor Indus., 1998 E.C.R.
1-7053, 7079 [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 [19981 5 16; Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France v.
Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, 1502 168; Case C-449/93, Rockfon A/S v.
Specialarbeijderforbundet iDenmark, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4291, 4317 5 28; Case C-372/88, Mill Mktg.
Bd. of Eng. v. Cricket St. Thomas Estate, 1990 E.C.R. 1-1345, 1376, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 800 (1990]
5 19; Case C-283/81 C.I.L.F.I.T., 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3430, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 472 [1982] 20;
Case C- 11/76, Netherlands v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 245, 278 5 6; Case C-30177, Bochereau,
1977 E.C.R. 1999, 2010 5 14; ANWEILER, supra note 109, at 172 et seq.; the Court of the Andean
Community (Dec. 3, 1987, proc. 1-IP-87), 28 GACETA OFICIAL DEL AcUERDO DE CARTAGENA 1.12,
3.12.-4.12 (15.2.1988).
113. See Case C-149/97, Institute of the Motor Indus., 1998 E.C.R. 1-7053, [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 326
[1998] at 5 17 (for the systematic principal exceptio strictissima applicationis est).
114. DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 111 (distinguishing the interpretion of Community law from the
interpretation of other "simple" uniform law and seeing little applicability of the systematic
method).
115. See Adriana Dreyzin de Klor, Hacia un ordenamiento juridico del Mercosur, [1996-C] L.L. 1189,
1198. Cf Case C-218/82, EC Comm'n v. EC Council, 1983 E.C.R. 4063,4075, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R.
350 [1983]; ANWEILER, supra note 109, at 185 et seq. and Lutter, supra note 69, at 603. See also
Fabricio, supra note 64, at 19; supra note 7 (for the relationship to the constituting treaties and
the particularities during the period of transition).
116. Cf Case C-64/81, Cormann, 1982 E.C.R. 13, 24 8. See also KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 271-
72 (postulating, as a rule in case of doubt, the prevalence of international uniformity over the
presumed coherence of the national legal order, which could not be as rigid).
117. See infra note 119 (for the general treatment of parallel agreements).
118. Cf. DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 111 (discussing the similar situation of the later accession to
uniform law based on international treaties).
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countries to the MERCOSUR. 1 19 Yet, the above mentioned parallel Agreement on
International Commercial Arbitration (CMC 4/98) somewhat addresses this situation. It
establishes a double standard in articles 19 Nr. 4 and 23 by remitting cases within the MER-
COSUR to the relevant MERCOSUR agreements but those involving associated countries to
other international instruments or national law.120 For practical reasons, such divergence
may be inevitable. Fortunately, the specific differences are only minor and thus should not
interfere with the uniform systematic interpretation. In principle, the interpretation of the
parallel agreements should use the genuine Community law as the fundamental guideline.
This would guarantee the uniformity even though minor differences may persist due to
explicit remittal to other legal orders.
3. Autonomous Historical Interpretation.
The historical interpretation can only play a limited role because Community law is a
compromise achieved by different states with their respective national interests and legal
traditions. Frequently, one national concept dominates and is promoted and elevated to
the Community level. Because an autonomous and uniform interpretation of
Community law has priority, the history of establishment and the underlying national
models can only serve as complementary sources of interpretation 12 1 unless explicit ref-
erence is made to them in the legal instrument itself.122 For the purpose of comparative
119. Compare the similar difficulties encountered by the European Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, and the parallel
Agreement of Lugano, Sept. 16, 1988. Still, this latter one prescribes corresponding mechanisms
for the consolidation of uniformity as, for example, the recognition of the rulings of the E.C.J by
the parties of Lugano, which are not Member States of the E.C. See e.g., the Swiss Federal Court,
Sept. 9, 1998, 124 BGE 11444, 447 (1998); SCHMIDT-PARZEFALL, supra note 53, at 57 et seq.
120. See supra note 20 (for the parallel structure of this agreement and its implications).
121. Fortunately, this coincides with the restrictive tendency in the national conceptions of the his-
torical interpretation. See supra note 98.
122. For the possibilities of using the travaux prdparatoires, see the established practice of the E.C.J.
See Case C-368/96, Generics [UK], [ 1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 181 [1998 5 26 (although quite generous
in 5 27-28); Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, 1501 5 167;
Case C-329/95, VAG Sverige, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2675, 2694 5 23; Case C-292/89, Antonissen, 1991
E.C.R. 1-745, 778, [19911 2 C.M.L.R. 373 [19911 18; the Opinions of the Advocate General
DARMON ibid. 758, 762 et seq. 5 15 et seq.; Case C-15/60, Simon v. Court of Justice, 1961 E.C.R.
239, 262; Lutter, supra note 69, at 599 et seq. (the E.C.J. refers to the history of establishment
regularly only as a supplementary substantiation of the result reached by applying the teleolog-
ical method, rather than as an independent method). See supra note 116 (the quite restrictive
historical recourse to the underlying norms of the Member States). The restrictions on the his-
torical interpretation established by the E.C.J. also correspond with article 31 I of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. See supra note 71.
"The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relat-
ing to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the
conclusions of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more
parties ... as an instrument related to the treaty." Id.
See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES 214 (1970). For details, see ANWEILER, supra note 109,
at 246 et seq.; Lutter, supra note 69, at 601. Nevertheless, the relevance of historical materials
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analysis 123 and a better understanding of the law, the history of Community law may,
however, be very helpful. 124
4. Objective-teleological Interpretation.
The objective-teleological method is of special importance because it provides the
basis for the primacy of uniform interpretation of Community law. The basic intention of
any Community law is integration and legal harmonization as stipulated by its primary
sources. 125 Every provision has to be interpreted in accordance with this premise, consid-
ering its uniform application throughout the Community.126 In essence, this is the teleo-
logical component of a systematic interpretation based on the ratio conventionis primae
or eventually the ratio communitatis.127
Furthermore, the specific purpose of a particular provision shall be explored when
applying this method of interpretation. Preference is given to interpretation consistent
with the purpose or intent of the provision 128 and in harmony with the underlying prin-
ciples and other fundamental objective decisions of the MERCOSUR.129
seems to be quite different in the unification by the adoption of model laws. See, e.g., Berger,
supra note 45, at 35 (calling it "paramount"); KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 275-76; similarly
Antonio Boggiano, The Experience of Latin American States, in INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN
PRACTICE 43-44 (1988).
123. See infra note 142 (for a more differentiated view).
124. See, e.g., the valuable remarks of the Argentine Foreign Ministry set forth in supra note 26. But
see DROMI, EKMEKDJIAN & RIVERA, supra note 52, at 185-86 (speaking of an "applicability of
practically zero").
125. Cf. supra note 3.
126. Dreyzin de Klor, supra note 115, at 1198 (speaking of the "principio armonizador"); EDUARDO
HOOFT, El Mercosur y el derecho privado, [1992-E] L.L. 870, 874. See also Court of the Andean
Community (Dec. 3, 1987, proc. 1-IP-87), 28 GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 1.12,
3.12-4.12 (15.02.1988) (describing explicitly the fundamental teleological interpretation);
Boggiano, supra note 122, at 43 and KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 276-77 (both for the general
international uniform law); DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 114 (thus not deeming the teleological
interpretation even worth mentioning as a matter of course); Samtleben, supra note 109, at 100
(for the "C6digo Bustamante").
127. See supra note 115 (for the systematic interpretation in conformity with the primary sources of
Community law). See supra note 55 et seq. (for the duty of legal harmonization deriving from
the constitutive treaties).
128. Dreyzin de Klor, supra note 115, at 1198; DROMI, EKMEKDJIAN & RIVERA, supra note 52, at 184-
85; cf Samtleben, supra note 22, at 35. For the established practice of the E.C.J., see all deci-
sions quoted in supra note 112 (interpreting provision by reference to the purpose); see also
Case C-370/96, Covita, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7711, 7744 5 36; Case C-36/69, Gtinaydin v. Freistaat
Bayern, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5143, 5170, [1998] 2 C.L.M.R. 871 [1997] 5 38 (referring to the
conguency of this interpretation with the effet util); ANWEILER, supra note 109, at 198 et seq.;
Lutter, supra note 69, at 602 etseq.; Court of the Andean Community (Dec. 3, 1987, proc. 1-IP-
87), 28 GACETA OFICIAL DEL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA.
129. Casella, supra note 47, at 99 (refering explicitly to the consideration of the fundamental eco-
nomical objectives of the integration). Securing democracy can be named as another funda-
mental value laid down in the Protocol of Ushuaia of July 24, 1998 on the Democratic
Compromise of the member states and the associated countries, (visited July 26, 1999)
<http://bull.bull.com.uy/secretariamercosur/PROTUSU.HTM>. See also KROPHOLLER, supra
note 52, at 277.
Winter 2000 29
5. Persuasive Authorities of the other Member States.
The classical criteria of interpretation (even mutatis mutandis) find their limits in the
personal appreciation of the respective legal practitioner. 130 These methods provide for no
other influence to ensure uniform application of Community law by the respective national
judges beyond the common texts as sources of enlightenment. Yet, these are not enough to
counter-balance the absence of guiding supranational judicial decisions. The potential of
obstructive self-complacency calls for the view across the borders to secure the necessary
Community-wide uniformity.' 31 The decisions of the courts as well as the legal opinions of
scholars in other countries applying the uniform law are indispensable sources for the inter-
pretation of Community law.132 Certainly, the interpretations by other courts cannot have
any prejudicial authority due to the lack of a legal basis for any restrictions on the sovereign
jurisdiction. 133 These foreign courts can, however, assume the role of persuasive authorities
from whose interpretation, for the sake of uniformity, the national authority should not
deviate unless there are compelling reasons to do so in a particular case. 134 Generally, this
understanding can and should lead to a powerful additional potential for legal reasoning.135
It seems important to point out that this method is not comparative law strictu sensu.136
Rather, it means paying due consideration to the opinions of relevant authorities dealing
with the very same law whether abroad or at home.' 37
Awareness for the legal culture of the neighboring countries is traditionally quite
underdeveloped in the Latin American countries. 138 A constant flow and exchange of
information between courts in different countries is now of paramount importance. 139
Publishing laws and decisions on the Internet free of charge could substantially improve
this process.140
130. Cf STF, 05.30.1998, 161 RTJ 674-75 (1997) (recognizing this weakness of the classical methods).
131. Tosi, supra note 47, at 58.
132. Cf. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 45, at 21; Lutter, supra note 69, at 604 (reference to the
European law, of an "owed part" of the international obligation of the State).
133. Cf DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 112; in detail KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 281 etseq.
134. See also ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 45, at 19-20; Cf Berger, supra note 45, at 33; DIEDRICH,
supra note 53, at 112-13; Lutter, supra note 69, at 604; Boggiano, supra note 122, at 45-46;
KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 282-83.
135. Cf DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 112; Lutter, supra note 69, at 604.
136. Berger, supra note 45, at 35; KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 278, 280; Lutter, supra note 69, at
604.
137. Cf. Boggiano, supra note 122, at 47 (stating that a new, independent Common Law of the
Community, a "uniform caselaw;' would be the solution to the problem of uniform interpretation).
138. Garro, supra note 56, at 28 (exemplifying the much larger orientation by the European and
North American jurisprudence, as well as other obstructing pecularities); see also Boggiano,
supra note 122, at 46.
139. Tosi, supra note 47, at 58 (demanding the coordination of the established respective national
interpretations of Community law). Cf. KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 285-86 (presenting, as a
model, the distribution of the "Nordisk Domssamling" containing the decisions of the superior
courts regarding the nordic uniform laws, which is free of charge).
140. In Brazil, see Brasil - Supremo Tribunal Federal (visited July 26, 1999) <http://www.stf.gov.br>;
<http://200.130.4.8/netahtml/jurisp.html>; STI - Jurisprudencia (visited July 26, 1999)
<http://www.stj.gov.br/jurisprudencia>; Senate Federal (visited July 26, 1999)
<http://www.senado.gov.br>. In Argentina, see Poder Judicial de la Nacion; Corte Suprema de
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6. A Genuine Method of Comparative Law.
For discovering the foundations of the Community law, the method of comparative
law is regularly among the most valuable tools of interpretation.141 In case the aforemen-
tioned methods cannot bring about the necessary clarity, a uniform interpretation can
still be achieved by uncovering the basis of a Community provision, that is, the national
legal orders and traditions.142 This is, beyond the restricted historical method, the conse-
quent reaction to the procedure of the modern legislator. He takes his solutions from
comparative law in the first place143 -a procedure that is inevitable, especially in the
process of creating Community regulations. 144 The comparative method is, therefore,
regularly invoked or taken for granted when analyzing the law of the MERCOSUR.1
4 5
Justicia de la Nacion (visited July 26, 1999) <http://www.pjn.gov.ar/corte.htm>; (visited July
26, 1999) <http://www.pjn.gov.ar/fallos.htm>; Boletin Oficial Republica Argentine (last modi-
fied Dec. 1998) <http://sntsi.jus.gov.ar/minis/servi/boletin/Inicial.htm>; Sistema Argentino de
Informatica Juridica (visited July 26, 1999) <http://www.saij.jus.gov.ar>. In Chile, see Biblioteca
del Congreso Nacional (visited July 26, 1999) <http://sisred.congreso.cl/cgi-bin/webbcn.web>.
In Uruguay, see Direcci6n Nacional de Impresiones y Publicaciones Oficiales (visited July 26,
1999) <http://www.impo.com.uy>. In Bolivia, see Republica de Bolivia Honorable Congreso
Nacional (visited July 26, 1999) <http://www.congreso.gov.bo/indexv3.html>.
141. ZWEIGERT/KOTZ, supra note 45, at 21; see also DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 113; KROPHOLLER,
supra note 52, at 278.
142. For details on the comparative method of the E.C.J. for elaborating the "general principles of
law as resulting from the totality of the domestic legal orders" see, e.g., Case C-29/76, LTU v.
Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. 1541, 1551 5 3 (F.R.A.); Case C-133/78, Gourdain v. Nadler, 1979
E.C.R. 733, 743 5 3 (F.R.A.); Case C-814/79, Netherlands v. Riffer, 1980 E.C.R. 3807, 3819 5 7;
Case C-157/80, Rinkau, 1981 E.C.R. 1391, 1400 5 11 (Neth.); see ANWEILER, supra note 109, at
277 et seq.; Pierre Pescatore, Le Recours, Dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des
Communautds Europ~ennes, a Des Normes Dduites de la Comparaison Des Droits Des fltats
Membres, 32 REV.INT'L DROIT COMP. 337, 338 et seq. (1981); Hans-Wolfram Daig, Zu
Rechtsvergleichung und Methodenlehre im Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR
KONRAD ZWEIGERT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 395, 411 etseq. (Herbert Bernstein ed., TObingen 1981)
(calling the E.C.J. "the stronghold of applied comparative law"). See also SCHMIDT-PRZEFALL,
supra note 53, at 43; Dieter Martiny, Autonome und Einheitliche Auslegung im Europiaischen
Internationalen Zivilprozefirecht, 45 RABELSZ 427, 441 et seq. (1981) (referring to the European
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters). See generally ZWE1GERT & KOTZ, supra note 45, at 21.
143. Cf. ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 45, at 18.
144. Cf. Casella, supra note 67, at 88; KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 236.
145. Compare Casella, supra note 47, at 93, 93-94 (applying the comparative method when analyzing
the law of the MERCOSUR); Ricardo Lorenzetti, La Relaci6n del Consumo: Conceptualizacidn en
Base al Derecho del Area del Mercosur, [ 1996-El L.L. 1303, 1303 (reacting to the comparative leg-
islative method); Adriana Dreyzin de Klor, El Mercosur: Generador de una Nueva Fuente de
Derecho Internacional Privado, 6 E.D. 489, 495 (1996); id., Dreyzin, supra note 115, at 1198;
Sandra A. Frustragli & David F. Esborraz & Carlos A. Hernandez, Aportes Para la Puesta en
Marcha del Mercosur (Aspectos Contractuales de Consumo), [1995-Al L.L. 923, 923; Jorge Luis
Maiorano, Armonizaci6n del Derecho Administrativo en el Mercosul [sic], 699 R.T. 23, 24 (1994);
Ana Maria M. de Aguinis, Armonizaci6n Juridica en el Mercosur: Los Grupos de Sociedades, [ 1992-
E] L.L. 1231, 1232. For the application of comparative law as a source of interpretation for the
national law in Brazil, see STF, 09.16.1998, D.J.U. 23.10.1998, p. 5; STF, 03.31.1998 D.J.U.
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a. The Interpretation based on the Comparative Method.
According to Kropholler, four categories of uniform regulations are to be distin-
guished, each implying a different treatment in light of the comparative method: (1) rules
based on conceptions commonly accepted in all Member States; (2) rules without any
precedents in national solutions, but rather, for example, in other international conven-
tions; (3) rules clearly favoring one of several rivaling solutions in different national legal
orders; and (4) rules forming a compromise between different national positions by
adopting elements of various legal orders. 146 The essential importance of comparative
law for understanding the so-created Community provision is self-evident in types one
and four.147 But even the scope of a new norm of type two can often be understood only
in light of the respective national solutions. 148 For norms of the third type, referring to a
national concept that served as a model for the Community regulation is, however, rather
problematic. 149 If no express reference is made to the national law, its influence has to be
restricted to a merely supplementary role.' 50 Even if the "legislator of the Community"
has opted for a particular national solution, the then autonomous regulation has to be
understood in light of its new Community-wide dimension, which the national model
could not possibly have taken into account. 15 1 This is where the comparative approach
can contribute very effectively. It analyzes the specific regulative conceptions of all partici-
pating states and puts them into a larger context, facilitating even the dynamic adaptation
of the Community law in a uniform way.' 52
b. Excursus Filling lacunae of Community Statutes.
At this point the question rises of how to bridge possible gaps in the legal provisions
of the Community law. How are specific problems to be solved that have been ignored by
a particular Community regulation although they clearly fall within the scope of the uni-
form law?
15.5.1998, p. 44; STF, 19.10.1995, D.J.U. 24.11.1995, p. 40,377; STF, 06.20.1995, 161 RTJ 643, 647
et seq. (1997); STF, 09.30.1992, 143 RTJ 710, 713 (1993); STF, 05.23.1991, 136 RTJ 508, 514
(1991). STJ, 11.20.1990, D.J.U. 2.12.1990, p. 14,331. See also Jos6 H. Meirelles Teixeira,
Interpretaoo e Aplicaoo da Constituifdo, 735 R.T. 750, 761 (reprint 1997) (1991). In Argentina,
cf C.S., Apr. 29, 1997, [1997-E] L.L. 766, 770-71 (Arg.); C.S., Oct. 6,1994, [1995-A] L.L. 201,211
et seq. (Arg.). See SOLAR, supra note 81, at 124 (showing the Chilean attitude toward comparative
law). In Paraguay, see SOLER, supra note 81, at 531; see also supra note 95.
146. KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 279-80 (referring generally to international uniform law).
147. Id.
148. KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 279.
149. See Lutter, supra note 69, at 601-02 (referring to the vast differences in English legal literature
regarding the meaning of section 54 of the English Companies Act 1948 ("true and fair view"
rule), which nevertheless served as a model for Article 2 III of the 4th EC-Directive [78/660
EEC of 14.8.1978] and is consequently now incorporated in § 264 II of the German Code of
Commerce). See also infra p. 24 (concerning the problems of the historical method).
150. See Case C-6418, Cormann, 1982 E.C.R. 13, 24 1 8; see also Lutter, supra note 69, at 602; see gen-
erally KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 280 (referring to international uniform law).
151. Cf. Bustamante Alsina, supra note 45, at 1159. See also supra note 104.
152. Cf DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 108 (on the necessity of a dynamic uniform law) and at 113
(arguing that this assures avoiding the fallback to a single domestic legal order); DROMI,
EKMEKDJIAN & RIVERA, supra note 52, at 182 (referring to the MERCOSUR).
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(i) Analogy.
For this situation, the instrument of analogy has been developed at the national level.
This method can be summarized as being the application of a similar solution (mutatis
mutandis) to an unforeseen problem to bridge the legislative gap. In the civil law system,
this procedure requires the statutes to show a lack of regulation incompatible with the
original legislative intentions. On the other hand, a specific interest in regulation clearly
comparable to that underlying another similar provision is necessary to justify the judge
assuming quasi-legislative powers to fill the gap. 153 The applicability of analogy to uni-
form Community law is quite problematic. The analogous application of other
Community norms should, in principle, be admissible. However, the chances of this
being opportune are rather rare in the face of the restrictive conception of a legitimate
analogy and the still quite fragmentary legal order of the Community.154
In contrast, the analogous application of domestic law by the national judge, that is, the
referral to isolated legal concepts of an individual Member State, would clearly violate the
primacy of the uniform Community law.155 There is no comparable interest in regulation
because of the communitarian dimension. Nevertheless, the analogous application of
domestic law would be in accordance with the aforementioned concepts that legal provisions
in international treaties are only leges speciales vis-A-vis the national provisions.' 56 From this
point of view, referring back to the general laws of the Member State (leges generales) would
seem at first sight to be quite natural and coherent. 157 If this shall be avoided, the national
judge has to be offered an alternative set of legal principles as a fallback option.158
153. See LARENZ, supra note 105, at 265 et seq. (focusing on methodological details); FIKENTSCHER,
supra note 52, at 726 (critiquing the previous point); infra note 159 (applying the analogy in
the countries of the MERCOSUR).
154. See supra note 110.
155. See DIEDRICH, supra note 53, at 114-15 (addressing controversy with respect to the internation-
al uniform law); Bayer, supra note 17, at 634-35. For the delimitation between gaps compre-
hended by uniform law and those gaps beyond the scope of Community regulation, thus open
for national analogy, see KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 302-03 (author is more open for the
analogy at 293 et seq.).
156. See supra note 31 et seq. (examining the quality of Community law as lex specialis in Brazil,
Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia).
157. Cf Bayer, supra note 17, at 634-35.
158. Id. at 637.
159. In Brazil, see art. 4 LICC ("Quando a lei for omissa, o juiz decidird o caso de acordo com a
analogia, os costumes e os principios gerais de direito."). See also Lobo, supra note 84, at 103;
SERPA LOPES, supra note 81, at 177 et seq. & 188 et seq. In Argentina, see art. 16 CC ("Si una
cuesti6n no puede resolverse, ni por las palabras, ni por el espiritu de la ley, se atenderd a los
principios de leyes andlogas; y si amn la cuesti6n fuere dudosa, se resolverA por los principios
generales del derecho, teniendo en consideraci6n las circunstancias del caso."). See also TORRES
LACROZE & MARTIN, supra note 81, at 363. In Chile, see art. 24 CC )"En los casos a que no
pudieren aplicarse las reglas de interpretaci6n precedentes, se interpretartn los pasajes
obscuros o contradictorios del modo que mAs conforme prezca al espiritu general de la legis-
laci6n y a la equidad natural?'). PABLO RODRIGUEZ GREZ, TEORIA DE LA INTERPRETACION 124 et
seq. (Santiago de Chile 1995) (explaining that the judge has to decide just as the legislator
would have solved the problem). If there are no indications for such hypothetical, he has to
refer to analogy. Id. at 124-25. If this is not possible, the general principles of law have to be
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(ii) The General Principles of Law.
The legal systems of all participating countries contain statutory provisions that
allow the judge to refer to analogous domestic law as well as to the "General Principles of
Law" when faced with the difficult task of having to fill a statutory lacuna.159 For the
aforementioned reasons, the judge should realize analogy is not suitable as applied to
Community law because this would violate the clear intent of the legislator to create uni-
form law. A possible solution to this problem is for the judge to uncover such principles
that have binding force for all authorities entrusted with the implementation of the pro-
visions of Community law.160
In light of the teleological postulates of uniformity and autonomy, the general princi-
ples have to be understood as the general principles of the legal order of the Community.
This means they have to be evaluated on the basis of the law that contains the gap by ana-
lyzing which general concepts of regulation have shaped that law. The concepts of the
individual national legal orders shall be contrasted in order to derive a hypothetical regu-
lation on which the contracting countries would have been able to agree. 16 1 In a similar
fashion, the European Court of Justice puts special emphasis on "the General Principles
of Law, as resulting from the totality of the domestic legal orders," which have to be
deduced by applying the method of comparative law.162
This shows that, in dealing with Community law, legal construction latu sensu, that
is, both interpretation and bridging statutory lacunae, are based on the same method-
ological tools and heavily depend on the method of comparative law.16 3
analyzed to find the presumption. Id. at 127. See also CARLOS Ducci CLARO, INTERPRETACION
JURIDICA 152 et seq. (3rd ed., Santiago de Chile 1989). In Uruguay, see art. 16 CC ("Cuando
ocurra un negocio civil, que no pueda resolverse [por la interpretaci6n], se acudird a los funda-
mentos de las leyes andlogas; y si todavia subsistiere la duda, se ocurrird a los principios gen-
erales de derecho y a las doctrinas mis recibidas, consideradas las circunstancias del caso.").
Accord TAC Montevideo, Mar. 9, 1994, 109 LJU I 799, 803 (1994) (where reference is made to
the general principles of law in case of failure of the analogy). In detail JIMENEZ DE ARECHAGA,
supra note 81, at 126 et seq. See also TAFam Montevideo, Nov. 9, 1993, 108 LJU I 392, 394
(1994) (because the Treaties of Montevideo (1889/1940) and a lacuna in the Uruguayan
Private International Law did not apply, the provisions of the Treaties of Montevideo were
respectively applied by invoking the analogy.). In Paraguay, see art. 62 CC ("Si una cuesti6n no
puede resolverse por [la interpretaci6n], se tendrdn en consideraci6n las disposiciones que reg-
ulan casos a materias anilogas, y en su defecto, se acudird a los principios generales de dere-
cho."). See also SOLER, supra note 81, at 547 et seq. In Bolivia, see art. 1932 Code of Civil
Procedure ("C6digo de Procedimiento Civil") ("[En caso de falta, oscuridad o insuficiencia de
la ley, el juez] deberi fundar su sentencia en los principios generales de derecho, las leyes
antlogas o la equidad que nace del ordenamiento juridico del Estado."). See also Moscoso
DELGADO, supra note 91, at 419 etseq.
160. Cf Case C-230/78, Eridania-Zuccherifici Nazionali SpA v. Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry,
1979 E.C.R. 2749, 2771 5 31 (Italy). In detail ANWEILER, supra note 109, at 333 et seq.
161. See Bayer, supra note 17, at 637; ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 45, at 18, 21; KROPHOLLER, supra
note 52, at 299.
162. See supra note 142; see also 1 DAVID VAUGHAN ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
358 etseq. (1986).
163. Cf KROPHOLLER, supra note 52, at 299.
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III. Final Remarks.
Even though the methodological questions arising from the practical challenge of
applying Community law may seem rather abstract and theoretical, they are, nevertheless,
of enormous practical relevance. If law is understood as social engineering, then the
impact that its daily application has on individual lives is the essential guideline. Doubts
about the fundamental tools of the social engineer, or rather, in the case of the judge, of
the service technician, cannot be left for an uncertain future when the dynamic modifica-
tions of economy and society are already in full process. Establishing uniform
Community law implies the claim to manipulate societies by involving a new dimension.
Formerly self-centered societies are suddenly drawn much closer together, first, for the
sake of better commerce and second, for better economic development. But this conver-
gence, as every process of integration, will also always affect society as a whole.
The national lawyer, comfortably embedded in his traditional domestic concepts and
methods and maybe already a little bit sleepy with so much coziness, will have to assume
a new role urgently needed by the new Community. He is suddenly required to leave his
little warm and snug shelter and jump into the much broader bed of the legal order of the
Community, still cold and very Spartan, that he even has to share with others! This is no
easy task, especially considering the vast dimension of work that follows from the indis-
pensable requisite of the comparative method. To put the legal order of the Community
to work and to handle the new and much more demanding tools, he will need a lot of
support. This shows the fundamental importance of scientific research on the field of
comparative law especially with respect to the MERCOSUR. 164 The legal order of the
MERCOSUR offers a new, exciting challenge for legal scholars who are thus called upon
to participate in this young and dynamic process.
164. At this point, reference shall be made to the large research project by the Max-Planck-Institute
for Foreign Private and Private International Law (Hamburg/Germany) on the "Economic Law
of the MERCOSUR' involving the law of competition, the law of transportation, the law of
international civil procedure and the law of arbitration of the MERCOSUR, led by Prof. Dr.
Jurgen Basedow and Dr. Jiirgen Samtleben.
